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Democratic elections matter, but how much they matter depends entirely on how free, open and fair 
they are. Elections remind us not only of the rights, but the responsibilities of citizenship in a 
democracy. 
Elliott Abrams & Robert Kennedy
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ABSTRACT 
Regional Organizations hereinafter referred as Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are 
the building blocks of the African Union. They promote regional integration, democratization, 
cooperation, development and peace and security within African States. RECs complement the 
instruments of the AU on democracy consolidation and its shared norms and values. Since 
elections are at the centre for democracy, development and human rights, RECs have a mandate 
to protect and promote them. Protection and promotion of democratic elections have become a 
priority among the RECs. RECs have adopted legal instruments to protect democratic elections. 
They observe elections within Member States. They effectively conduct pre- and post-electoral 
audits to facilitate smooth conduct of elections. They facilitate mediation when electoral 
disputes arise. RECs also facilitate political negotiations and dialogues in times of electoral 
conflicts. They enhance restoration of democracy when it is violated. They assist with 
interventions when governments act unconstitutionally and refuse to step down from power. In 
some cases, they impose sanctions, where necessary, to states violating democracy and human 
rights. Thus, the role of the RECs is dynamic and has been expanding over the years to meet 
the needs of their regions.  
However, despite the establishment of RECs, and their mandates in supporting consolidation 
of democracy, election disputes have been prevalent in Africa. Electoral malpractices have 
been in the form of vote rigging, manipulation of vote results, refusal of incumbent heads of 
state to step down after losing elections to mention a few. This happened in the Gambia in 2016 
as discussed in this study.  In some cases, independent electoral commissions have committed 
gross errors in vote counting as in the case of Zimbabwe 2018 elections. These errors have 
caused election disputes and political uprisings. Election monitoring bodies have also failed to 
provide accurate reports on the outcome and conduct of elections and have caused a cycle of 
contested elections in some African countries. The case of the SADC Observer Mission in 
Zimbabwe is a good example in this study. Elections that have lacked credibility and integrity 
have led to crises of legitimacy in governance.  
The lack of legitimacy and credibility of elections have undermined human rights and freedoms 
linked to democratic elections. This research argues that contestations over elections should 
not be seen in isolation from the entire human rights discourse. Human rights are 
interdependent and, therefore, when one right is affected other rights suffer in turn. Protection 





                                   CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Study 
The African Union (AU) has adopted several relevant instruments for the promotion and 
protection of democratic elections in Africa.1 However, the AU has not always been effective 
in contributing to credible and legitimate elections in Africa.2 In fact, electoral disputes have 
become more frequent.3  The prevalence of election disputes erodes democracy, good 
governance and human rights. 4 Scholars argue that disputed elections weaken democratic 
institutions5 and the process of democratization in Africa.6 Studies suggest that democratisation 
is an on-going process that is supported by regular, free, fair, credible and legitimate electoral 
processes.7 More so, studies also point out that military coups have undermined democratic 
elections and eroded democratic principles among African states.8  Elections that are free from 
these violations are instrumental for democratic and peaceful transfer of power.9  
Disputed elections arise from electoral malpractices. These include vote rigging, human error,10 
falsification of results, manipulating the constitution before an election and thuggery.11 Other 
malpractices are vote buying, manipulation of the voters roll and the refusal of incumbent 
governments to step down after losing elections, among others. 12   
 
1
 These include: The Constitutive Act of the AU of 2000; the Protocol on the Pan-African Parliament 2001; the 
Protocol on the Peace and Security Council 2002; the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 
2007; to mention a few. 
2 T Alemu ‘The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance: A Normative Framework for 
Analysing Electoral Democracy in Africa’ (2007). Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria. 
3 These include but not limited to:  Egypt (2005), Ethiopia (2005, 10), Uganda (2006, 11), Nigeria (2007), Kenya 
(2007-8, 2013), Zimbabwe (2008, 2013, 2018), Algeria (2009, 14), Libya (2014), Malawi (2014,18), Zambia 
(2015), Sudan (2015), Togo (2015), Burundi (2015) and DRC (2016-18) and Gambia (2016/17). 
4 Alemu op cit note 2  
5 Ibid.  
6 Ndubuisi Christian Ani ‘ISS Today: How serious is the African Union about democracy’? The Daily Maverick 
1 October 2018, available at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-10-01-how-serious-is-the-african-
union-about-democracy , accessed 3 July 2019.  See also, O Oko ‘Consolidating Democracy on a Troubled 
Continent: A Challenge for Lawyers in Africa’ (2000) 33 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 573 at 578 
7 Tikikel Alemu The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance: A Normative Framework for 
Analysing Electoral Democracy in Africa (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Pretoria, 2007). 
8 This has been demonstrated, for example, in the cases of the Central African Republic (2003), Togo (2005), 
Mauritania (2005), Comoros (2007), Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009), Niger (2010), Mali (2012), Guinea-
Bissau (2012) and Egypt (2014) to mention a few. 
9 The Role of Elections in strengthening democracy principles and values. Available at: https://agora-
parl.org/interact/blog/role-elections-strengthening-democracy-principles-and-values, accessed on 31 March 
2019.  
10 British-Angola Forum Conference Report Challenges for free and fair elections in Angola, available at 
http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/AO/BAFelections.pdf/at_download/file, accessed on 31 March 2019.   
11 Ibid.  




Elections have become central to democracy, good governance and human rights.13 Elections 
remind people not only of their rights, but the responsibilities of citizenship in a democracy.14 
Through elections, people can exercise their rights.  For example, people can take part in the 
conduct of public affairs of their country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.15 
Furthermore, people also have access to public service in their country. These rights are socio-
economic and civil and political. Socio-economic rights incorporate the right to work, the right 
to an acceptable standard of living; including food, clothing, and housing, the right to physical 
and mental health, the right to social security, the right to a healthy environment, and the right 
to education, to mention a few.16 Through voting, citizens participate in a civic society and 
demonstrate the importance of their voice. Elections also facilitate the realisation of civil and 
political rights. These include:  
the right to vote, the freedom of opinion and expression; freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association; the right to take part in the government of one's country through freely elected 
representatives; the right of equal access to public service in one's country; and the recognition 
that the authority of government derives from the will of the people, expressed in genuine 
periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret 
ballot.17  
The lack of protection of the democratic elections is at the core of democratic problems and 
violation of human rights in Africa.18 A true democracy is a place where numerous free and 
fair elections are held without disputes and with interchangeable candidates. When elections 
are disputed, a government’s credibility and legitimacy is compromised.19 Credible and 
legitimate elections are thus the cornerstone which guarantees governments’ legitimacy. Some 
scholars argue that elections confer legitimacy to incumbent governments.20 Without 
legitimacy, leaders and officials lack accountability to the public.21 Disputed elections may 
also result in the lack of confidence from the public and the electorate.22 Electoral integrity 
 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Art 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
16  Centre for Economic and Social Rights ‘Twenty-Five Years Fighting for Social Justice through Human Rights. 
What are Economic, Social and Cultural rights?’ available at http://www.cesr.org/what-are-economic-social-and-
cultural-rights, accessed on 21 August 2019. 
17 See Art 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.  
18 Daniel op cit note 12. 
19 For example, in Zimbabwe the legitimacy of elections has been highly contested by opposition parties after the 
2002. 2008, 2013 and 2018 presidential elections. 
20  D Nohlen, M Krennerich & B Thibaut Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook (1999) 12.  
21 Ibid. 




is therefore important because it does not only guarantee human rights, but allows good 
governance which is a tool that fosters peaceful resolution of conflicts which is important for 
peace and security of the continent. Electoral integrity also fosters open dialogue, debate and 
information sharing among leaders and the public.23 To ensure that elections have integrity 
and credibility, other factors outside of the electoral institutions need to be considered and 
strengthened. These include credible election officials and management bodies. Judges and 
courts must have the independence that the public respects.24 
Credible and legitimate elections are instrumental in advancing and enhancing the sovereignty 
of the people.25 The notion of sovereignty is reflected under the right to participation in 
international law which asserts that citizens are the ultimate repository of state sovereignty.26  
In sovereignty, true depiction of the will of the people can be reflected if international and 
regional standards of free and fair elections are fulfilled.27 The United Nations and the African 
Union have developed international and regional legislative frameworks to regulate standards 
for democratic elections.28 These standards are, therefore, a threshold upon which democracy, 
human rights, good governance, development, peace and security and the sovereignty of the 
people may be realised.  
Credibility and legitimacy of elections are measured by international 29 and regional laws on 
democratic elections.30 Various instruments, both binding and non-binding, have been adopted 
at international,31 regional 32 as well as sub- regional levels33 in an attempt to redress conflicts 
 
23 M Wiebusch ‘International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance Discussion Paper 17’ The role of 
regional organizations in the protection of constitutionalism (2016) at 61. 
24 Ibid. 
25 G Fox ‘The Right to Participation in International Law’ in G Fox and B R Roth (eds) Democratic Governance 
and International Law (2000) 50. 
26 Ibid.  
27 N Steytler, J Murphy, P de Vos & M Rewlamira Free and Fair Elections (1994) XXI. 
28  For example, the United Nations has adopted the Declaration of Principles for International Election 
Observation and The Code of Conduct for International Election Observers (2005), African Union Declaration 
on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, AHG/Decl.1 (XXXVIII), 2002. 
29 See Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and The Code of Conduct for International 
Election Observers (2005), See also, UN Committee on Human Rights, General Comment 25, ‘The Right to 
Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right to Equal Access to Public Service,’ 1510th meeting 
(fifty seventh session). 
30 Guidelines for African Union Electoral Observation and Monitoring Missions, 2002. 
31 These include: Art 21 of the Universal declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Art 25 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 13 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
32 The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) is the main regional and binding 
instrument that governs democratic elections. Other instruments are the African Charter; the Constitutive Act of 
the African Union (2000/1); the Protocol to the Peace and Security Council; the Guidelines for the Electoral 
Observation Missions (2004), the Ezulwini Framework (2009) among others. 
33 These include SADC Guidelines on Democratic Elections, ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good 




over democratic elections.34   Internationally, there are guidelines and principles stipulated for 
democratic elections.35   
In Africa, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) is the main 
legal instrument that governs regional standards on democratic elections. 36 The ACDEG is, 
among others, a framework upon which democratic elections in Africa are measured.  Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs) within the African Union have also developed various 
instruments to uphold credible and legitimate elections in their regions.37 Thus, the 
international and regional standards of democratic elections provide the normative basis upon 
which elections are considered credible and legitimate. These standards are enforced by the 
regional organisations. However, states have been increasingly failing to adhere to the 
regulations of the international and regional norms regarding democratic elections.38 
1.1.1  What are Regional Economic Communities? 
Regional Economic Communities are regional groupings of the African Members States of the 
African Union.39 The AU comprises of 55 Member States40 and was established in 2002 41 
upon the transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the AU.42 Its purpose 
was to play an essential role in the global economy and to address multifaceted social, 
economic and political problems in the global arena.43 To achieve this, the AU developed a 
normative framework to protect constitutionalism, particularly the constitutional transfer of 
power to foster stability, security, and democratic state building. 44 Over the years, RECs have 
adopted new and important roles. These roles include establishing violation of constitutional 
order among Member States, enforcing normative frameworks on constitutional governance, 
 
34 See note 29. 
35 See note 27. 
36 The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, Adopted by the AU in 2007. 
37 See note 30.  
38 For example, the following states:  Egypt (2005), Ethiopia (2005, 10), Uganda (2006, 11), Nigeria (2007), 
Kenya (2007-8, 2013), Zimbabwe (2008, 2013, 2018), Algeria (2009, 14), Libya (2014), Malawi (2014), Zambia 
(2015), Sudan (2015), Togo (2015), Burundi (2015) and DRC (2016-18) have experienced electoral disputes. 
39 The African Union ‘Regional Economic Communities (RECs)’. Available at: https://au.int/en/organs/recs, 
accessed 5 June 2019. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid. 
42 The Charter of the Organization of African Unity (1963). Adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 25 May 1963. 
The Charter was replaced in 2001 by the Constitutive Act of the African Union. 
43 The African Union ‘Regional Economic Communities (RECs)’. Available at: https://au.int/en/organs/recs, 
accessed 5 June 2019. 




developing proportional sanctions and facilitating return of constitutional order within Member 
States.45  
There are eight RECs officially recognised by the African Union. These are the Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development 
Community (SADC).46 See figure below.47 
 
 
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid. 
47Centre for Human Rights. MOOC Module 1.  ‘Introduction to the African Regional Human Rights System’. 




Figure 1. The picture above illustrates the Regional Economic Communities of the African 
Union. The flag outside the AU circle is that of Somaliland which for many years has functioned 
as an independent state but has not been recognised by other states and is, thus, not a member 
of RECs.48 
These regional institutions are contributing substantially to democratization,49 integration, 
cooperation and peacebuilding in their communities.50 They have enacted instruments that 
complement the instruments of the AU.51 For example, on democratic elections the SADC 
region has adopted Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections,52 the 
ECOWAS has adopted the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.53 These instruments 
also establish mechanisms such as courts that are making a significant contribution to the 
protection of human rights on the continent.54 
Within the RECs, courts or regional tribunals have been established. RECs courts provide supra 
national protection of human rights in Africa. The courts are charged with resolving disputes 
related to the REC’s treaty, protocols and conventions. The courts also have competence to 
hear individual complaints of alleged human rights violations. For example, under the SADC, 
a Tribunal was established in 1992. The Tribunal played an important role in dealing with 
violations of human rights among SADC Member States.55 However, the challenge within the 
SADC is that the Tribunal existed from 2005 until 2012 and have since been suspended.56 It is 
alleged that the suspension of the Tribunal came  after President Mugabe of Zimbabwe had 
failed to comply with the decisions of the Tribunal.57 The tribunal had brought down on its 
head the full wrath of the Robert Mugabe-led Zimbabwean government when it issued several 
 
48 Centre for Human Rights. MOOC Module 1.  Introduction to the African Regional Human Rights System. 
Available at: https://www.chr.up.ac.za/mooc, accessed 30 September 2019.   
49 Democratization include promoting credible and legitimate electoral processes.  
50 The African Union ‘Regional Economic Communities (RECs)’ op cit note 36.  
The African Union. Available at: https://au.int/en/organs/recs (Accessed 5 April 2019).  
51 These instruments include Protocols, Treaties, Guidelines, Plans of action and Model laws. They deal with 
democracy, good governance, the conduct of elections, and the promotion and protection of human rights to 
mention a few. 
52 SADC ‘Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections’, Revised, 2015. 
53ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, 2001.  
54 O C Ruppel Regional Economic Communities and Human Rights in East and Southern Africa, 2009.  See also, 
D Abebe ‘Does International Human Rights Law in African Courts Make a Difference?’, Virginia Journal of 
International Law 527 (2016). 
55 Ibid. 
56 Mail and Guardian ‘Quiet death of an important SADC institution’, available at https://mg.co.za/article/2014-





judgments against Zimbabwe.58 The Tribunal’s first verdict at the end of 2008 was already a 
landmark case. Zimbabwe had enforced a highly controversial land redistribution policy in the 
early 1990s.59 The Tribunal decided in Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of 
Zimbabwe that the government’s seizure of land owned by white farmers was indirect or ‘de 
facto’ discrimination and therefore unconstitutional and that the plaintiffs were entitled to 
compensation.60 Following this decision, Zimbabwe threatened to pull out of the SADC 
Tribunal, challenging its legitimacy.61  
The tribunal also found no champions among other SADC heads of state who, despite having 
initially agreed to permit individual access, found the prospect of being held liable to their 
citizens by a regional body distasteful.62 The Tribunal’s role has been reduced to jurisdiction 
over disputes among SADC member states, which deprives the court’s powers to a great extent 
and makes complaints by citizens against their governments impossible.63 This was a disgrace 
that an international instrument for individual complaints against human rights violations was 
suspended.64 Therefore, when elections are violated, especially in the case of Zimbabwe, the 
citizens have challenges in  taking their governments to the tribunal since the tribunal no longer 
has jurisdiction over such matters. 
Unlike the SADC region, citizens of ECOWAS member states can file complaints against 
human rights violations of state-actors at the regional court of justice (ECOWAS court of 
justice). The Gambia, as a member of the ECOWAS, has access to this court.65 The ECOWAS 
Court of Justice has already made several rulings on human rights issues. In 2008 the Court 
took a landmark decision concerning slavery where the State of the Niger was convicted, 
having violated the human rights of one of its citizens Mrs Hadijatou Mani. 66While the Court 
 
58 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. and Another v Minister of National Security Responsible for Land, Land Reform 
and Resettlement (124/06). 
59 Oliver C. Ruppel & F X Bangamwabo Chapter 8 The SADC Tribunal: A legal analysis of its mandate and role 
in regional integration, 2008 at 3. 
60 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. and Another v Minister of National Security Responsible for Land, Land Reform and 
Resettlement (124/06). 
61 ‘Centre for Human Rights Welcomes Constitutional Court’s Judgment on the invalidity of the disbandment of 
the SADC tribunal’, 2018. Available at: https://www.up.ac.za/faculty-of-law/news/post_2740045-centre-for-
human-rights-welcomes-constitutional-courts-judgment-on-the-invalidity-of-the-disbandment-of-the-sadc-
tribunal, accessed 20 October 2019.   
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid.  
65Economic Community of West African States Court of Justice, available at 





found that Niger was not itself responsible for the discrimination, the country was found in 
violation of its international obligations to protect Mrs Hadijatou Mani from slavery under 
international as well as national law.67 This was due to Niger’s tolerance, passivity, inaction, 
and abstention regarding the practice.68 Niger had to pay reparations in the amount of 10 million 
francs (CFA), an amount equivalent to more than 20,000 US-Dollars.69 The judgment has been 
referred to as historic, because this is one of the first slavery cases ever won at the international 
level.70 
Similarly, in 2012 the Constitutional Council of Senegal endorsed President Abdoulaye Wade 
as a presidential candidate for a third term. On the 16th of February 2012, RADDHO, a non-
governmental organisation based in Dakar, Senegal, lodged a complaint to the ECOWAS 
Community Court of Justice against the government of the Republic of Senegal.71 Although 
President Abdoulaye lost the election, the ECOWAS Court of Justice had made attempts to 
resolve the dispute on his bid for a third term.72 
Within the AU, RECs exist as subsidiary organizations of the Union.73 RECs were formed for 
several  reasons which are mostly rooted in the desire for economic and political cooperation 
of the AU.74 Their objectives are to promote regional economic welfare, collective self-reliance 
and regional integration.75 RECs play an important role in African governance as they advance 
the AU’s shared values, norms, and standards regarding continental unity.76  
In Africa, the Abuja Treaty of 1991 sought to establish RECs through an African Economic 
Community (AEC). The treaty emphasised the desirability of solidarity, collective self-




69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid.  
71 Case no. ECW/CCJ/APP/03/12. 
72 ECOWAS Court adjourns Senegal case for hearing on 4 May 2012, Centre for Human Rights, University of 
Pretoria. 
73 The African Union was founded on 26 May 2001 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and launched on 9 July 2002 in 
South Africa. The intention of the AU was to replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), established on 25 
May 1963 in Addis Ababa by 32 signatory governments 
74 See note 36  
75 Ibid 
76African Governance Architecture, ‘The Africa Governance Report: Promoting African Union Shared Values’ 
(2019). The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in Collaboration with the African Governance Architecture 




basic needs.77 RECs are regarded the building blocks of the AU.78 Their relationship with the 
AU is mandated by the Abuja Treaty and its Constitutive Act.79 The functional relationship 
between the AU and the RECs is guided by the following: the 2008 Protocol on Relations 
between the RECs and the AU, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in 
the Area of Peace and Security between the AU and RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms 
of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern and northern Africa.80 
RECs have played an important role in facilitating the enforcement of the AU’s shared values, 
particularly in situations involving unconstitutional changes of governments.81 These include 
sanctions, suspensions, mediation or military intervention. For example, RECs such as the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have been actively managing 
conflicts and preventing movement toward authoritarianism.82 Among the RECs, ECOWAS 
has been the most effective, with Nigeria serving as a strong anchor and advocate for 
democratization and peacekeeping.83  
The ECOWAS has intervened against, sanctioned and condemned actions taken by most of its 
Member States over the past two decades.84 It has organized peaceful resolutions and restored 
constitutional governments in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and the Gambia, among others.85 
Other RECs, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East 
African Community (EAC), have also organized collective stabilization efforts and sought to 
advance democratic governance. However, they have been less successful.86‘RECs have 
successfully contributed to democracy promotion and conflict management initiatives, 
including peace-making and peacekeeping, in numerous countries, such as Burundi, the Central 
African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gambia, Lesotho, 
Mali, South Sudan, and Somalia’.87 
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1.1.2 The Importance of RECs in Democratic Elections in Africa 
RECs are increasingly playing an important role in promoting free, fair, credible and legitimate 
elections.88 For example, RECs have been engaged in resolving post-electoral conflicts in 
Kenya (2007), Côte d’Ivoire (2010), Gambia (2016/17) and Zimbabwe (2008).89  Over the 
years RECs have been protecting and promoting the integrity of elections. RECs have also 
encouraged electoral responsibility among Member States at the national level.90 Their 
mandate has also extended to mediation of electoral disputes, imposing sanctions and 
suspensions on Member States who are guilty of violating democratic elections.91  
RECs have adopted legal instruments in their specific regions to regulate the conduct of 
democratic elections. As earlier mentioned, SADC has adopted Guidelines and Principles for 
Democratic Elections while ECOWAS has adopted a Protocol on Democracy and Good 
Governance. All these instruments advance the AU’s shared norms and values on democratic 
elections. More so, RECs have been taking initiatives to deploy teams to observe elections in 
their Member States. In some cases, this process entails sending fact-finding teams ahead of 
the missions to study and assess the general environment prior to the elections.92  
1.1.3 The Role of RECs in Promoting and Protecting Legitimacy and Credibility of 
Elections 
RECs play an important role in fostering the integrity of elections. Legitimacy refers to 
people’s (electorates’) beliefs about political authority and political obligations.93  Legitimacy 
also means a relationship between the people and their government. This often results from 
people participating in the selection of their government. A political regime is legitimate 
because it is selected and accepted by its people. Electorates have confidence in it and accept 
it.94 Thus, the legitimacy of political authority in the civil state depends on whether the transfer 
of authority has happened in the right way.95 This means tacit consent to the social contract and 
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to be bound to obey a state’s laws.96 Legitimacy morally justifies the existing authority such 
that the claims of the authority become moral obligations.97  
1.1.4 What Constitutes a Credible and Legitimate Electoral Process 
Elections are not just about who votes but also who doesn't vote. A credible and legitimate 
electoral process is one that meets regional and international standards of democratic elections. 
There are several pointers that makes an election credible. These include but are not limited to 
inclusivity, transparency, accountability and competitiveness. 
A credible election is one in which all citizens are treated equally despite the circumstances 
surrounding their lives. All parties contesting for an election must be accorded the same 
treatment. In addition, barriers must be removed for traditionally marginalized populations. 
These include ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, women, youth or elderly citizens; and 
persons with disabilities. 98 
Credible elections must be trusted by the electorates and all participants. The credibility of an 
election is enhanced when all stakeholders, including RECs, can independently verify whether 
the process is conducted honestly and accurately. The principle of transparency is linked to the 
fundamental right of citizens to seek, receive and impart information (which are elements of 
the freedom of expression), as well as the right to take part in government and public affairs.99 
Decision making processes must be open to scrutiny, and reasonable opportunities for public 
input should be provided. Information relating to all stages of the electoral cycle must be made 
available and accessible to citizens, including voters and candidates. Nonpartisan and partisan 
observers should be accredited to observe all phases of the electoral process and be permitted 
to comment publicly on the process free from unreasonable restriction. 
Accountability in elections is critical for the credibility of an election outcome. Accountability 
refers to the rights of citizens with respect to the conduct of other electoral stakeholders, 
including the government, election management bodies (EMBs), political parties, candidates 
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and security forces. Elections are not about records; they are about plans and choices of the 
people. Therefore, elections are a key mechanism through which citizens hold their 
governments accountable, but there should be accountability within electoral processes 
themselves.100 There ought to be effective remedies in place for violations of citizens' election-
related rights.101 There must also be administrative accountability for those organizing 
elections and those conducting governmental activities related to elections.102 In addition, there 
has to be timely procedures to bring to account those who conduct criminal acts that affect 
electoral-related rights.103 
Credible and legitimate elections must be competitive.104  Citizens must be accorded reasonable 
and equitable opportunities to compete to be elected to governmental offices. Political 
competition is a central component of elections that truly reflects the will of the people. The 
principle of competitiveness relates to aspects of the election throughout the electoral cycle.105 
Credible elections are those in which citizens are free to represent their interests on the ballot 
for parties and/or candidates of their choice.106 Parties and candidates must be able to campaign 
and voters to cast their ballots free from illegal influence, intimidation or violence.107 
1.2 Problem Statement 
In the presence of the legislative framework governing democratic elections in Africa and 
among the RECs, most African countries have held regular elections, albeit often flawed and 
contested.108 In the past decade, the RECs have been challenged by persistent governance 
deficits.109 Several reports have pointed to this effect. 
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 The 2017 Democracy Index indicates that many African countries remain under authoritarian 
and hybrid regimes.110 Their democratic institutions have serious weaknesses.111 A 2016 
Institute of Security Studies (ISS) study highlights that democracy in Africa often fails to 
translate into development because of the lack of governance capacity among leaders.112 
According to the report, many leaders come to power through patronage networks and rigged 
elections a situation created by the relative absence of competitive electoral systems.113 The 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) of 2017 also affirms that there has been an 
overall decline in good governance and electoral systems in Africa.114 In addition, the 
2018 Freedom House findings show that the transfer of power to ‘new leaders from old parties 
may fail to bring reform’.115  
In Zimbabwe, for instance, the new regime that replaced former President Robert Mugabe 
continues to use heavy-handed military measures to quash dissent.116 Until today, Zimbabwe 
has not achieved electoral reforms suitable for free and fair democratic elections.117 Other states 
that have experienced challenges with electoral democracy in the recent past are the Republic 
of the Gambia (2016-7),118 where the President of Gambia refused to step down after losing an 
election. In the DRC (2018)119 the elections were highly contested and there were delays in 
announcing elections results. In Sudan (April 2019) the civilians were killed and brutalised for 
calling for civilian government in preparation for free and fair elections after the fall of the 
former president Omar al-Bashir.120 Malawi (2019) had a highly contested election result after 
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the incumbent narrowly won the election.121 The governments of Zimbabwe and the Gambia 
are used as case studies in this paper. These governments have abdicated their responsibility to 
uphold credible and legitimate electoral processes in the past.  
Scholars also suggest that elections in Africa are ‘subject to human error and manipulation and 
it is mainly because incumbent governments want to cling to power especially ‘in poor 
countries’.122  In the past, the role of RECs has been undermined by an increase in the number 
of AU Member States experiencing electoral disputes. These Member States include but are 
not limited to Egypt (2005), Ethiopia (2005, 10), Uganda (2006, 11), Nigeria (2007), Kenya 
(2007-8, 2013), 2013, Algeria (2009, 14), Libya (2014), Malawi (2014, 2019), Zambia (2015), 
Sudan (2015), Togo (2015), Burundi (2015).123 When democratic elections are disputed, and 
when there is no public confidence in the elections, democracy is likely to suffer.  Therefore, 
elections should be respected and be conducted according to the law. Since elections are flawed 
and have been in most cases not conducted according to the law, this study seeks to explore the 
role of RECs in the promotion and protection of democratic elections.   
1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Study  
This study aims to investigate the role of RECs in upholding credible and legitimate electoral 
processes. The objectives of the study are: 
a) To identify ways in which the RECs resolve electoral disputes, uphold legitimacy and 
credibility of electoral processes in Africa; 
b) To examine the importance of RECs and ways in which the RECs may promote 
legitimacy and credibility of electoral outcomes;  
c) To examine the importance of legitimacy and credibility of electoral outcomes; and 
d) To make recommendations on the emerging practice of legalising electoral outcomes 
without legitimacy and credibility within the AU. 
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1.4 Significance of the Study 
Over the years, electoral disputes have become more prevalent in Africa. There have been 
serious complaints and contestations from many African states arising from electoral disputes 
which the Regional Organizations have attempted to resolve.124 This study seeks to discuss the 
role of RECs in upholding credible and legitimate electoral processes in Africa. This will give 
an insight in the protection of democratic elections within African states. There is need to 
research on the possibility of an effective standard of intervention among RECs in case of 
electoral disputes. Democratic institutions within some RECs in Africa have been vulnerable 
and have continued to suffer for lack of a proper regulatory enforcement protection. This has 
often led to impunity. 
This study is significant because it will analyse the role of RECs in upholding legitimate and 
credible electoral processes. Legitimate and credible electoral processes have the potential to 
strengthen democratic institutions in Africa. Strong democratic institutions are undermined and 
eroded by the lack of free, fair, and credible elections. Elections have become the measure in 
which the will of the people is respected. Fraudulent or manipulated elections exacerbate 
political instability within Member States.125 Regular, free and fair elections have become 
essential tools for legitimacy and democracy consolidation in Member States. 
This study is important because it speaks to the heart of human rights. Elections facilitate 
realization of all human rights namely; civil and political (first generation), social economic 
(second generation) and solidarity rights (third generation rights). Elections have become 
human rights events and are at the cornerstone of democracy.126 Elections empower people to 
exercise their rights and to participate in the selection of their political representatives.127 
Through elections people have the right to participate freely in the government of their country, 
either directly or through freely chosen representatives under the provisions of the law128 
Through elections people have  the right to take part in government, the right to vote129 and to 
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be elected and the right to equal access to public service.130 Failure to hand over power through 
democratic elections is detrimental to the continuation of democracy.131 Protection of 
democratic elections involves seeking to ensure that elections are conducted in accordance with 
internationally accepted standards. Secondly, it entails action to promote the development of 
standards for the protection of democratic elections among the RECs. 
1.5 Research Methods 
To achieve the aims and to answer the research questions of this research, the methodology 
employed in this study is purely qualitative. Data is obtained from primary and secondary 
sources. Therefore, the study is primarily based on a literature review of the primary and 
secondary sources relevant to the subject of discussion. The primary sources include 
international and regional human rights treaties. Other primary sources include relevant pieces 
of national legislation, regulations and case law. These will be consulted with a view to assess 
how the selected case studies and the role of RECs in regulating democratic elections, 
upholding legitimacy and credibility of elections. The study also heavily relies on secondary 
sources. These include, books, academic articles, and journals, research documents of 
international bodies such as the United Nations, journal articles, and case reports.  These will 
provide important information on the topic. In addition, various internet sites will also be 
consulted for relevant information pertinent to the subject of discussion. 
1.6 Limitations to the Study 
The scope of the paper is limited in terms of volume. This means that the paper only discusses 
one form of Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCGs) namely, ‘the refusal of 
incumbent governments to step down after losing an election’. This does not mean other forms 
not covered in this research are not relevant. The study is undertaken in South Africa and 
therefore most of the information is from literature reviews. There is significant reliance on 
secondary sources. The scope of the study is regionally focussed. This research is limited to 
two selected African countries namely, the Gambia and Zimbabwe.  
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The choice of the two countries for the case study is deliberate and strategic. Firstly, both 
countries have had election disputes. Secondly, The Republic of Gambia belongs to ECOWAS 
region and the Republic of Zimbabwe belongs to the SADC region. Therefore, the two 
countries are selected based on analysing the legal systems, the work and role of their respective 
regional economic communities. In addition, the selection of these two countries was premised 
on the need to analyse their legal systems regulating democratic elections and to identify the 
legal gaps within the RECs. The study therefore hopes that the conclusions and 
recommendations made in this study will be useful to the RECs that seek to embark on reform 
of their legislative framework and their enforcement mechanisms. Thus, the overarching aim 
of this thesis is to provide insights on the RECs in their efforts to uphold legitimate and credible 
electoral processes 
1.7 Literature Review 
There are several studies on the role of RECs in Africa.132 Important lessons can be drawn from 
these studies. These studies show that RECs work as subsidiary bodies of the African Union.133 
As subsidiary bodies, RECs have an obligation to cooperate with the African Union and the 
United Nations.134 In their cooperation with the AU and UN, Pavehouse argues that RECs are 
key drivers of democratic transformation, fostering cooperation between countries.135 They 
also influence the process of democratic consolidation’.136 This study examines the role of 
RECs in upholding credible and legitimate electoral processes in Africa. 
Zwanenburg conducted a study entitled, ‘Regional Organisations and the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security.’ The study argues that ‘the role of ‘RECs is primarily the 
maintenance of International Peace and Security’.137 The study further critically analyses ‘the 
regional peace operations’138 of the AU and their legal basis. However, the study did not focus 
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on democratic elections and their relation to international peace and security.  This study aims 
to show that democratic elections are closely linked to international peace and security. A 
similar study by Borgen argued that ‘the role of regional organizations is primarily for 
‘international peace and security’’.139 However, the study also overlooked the importance of 
democratic elections in their relation to peace and security within RECs. 
Nathan L, in his work How and why African Mediators Compromise Democracy, analyses and 
investigates the broad commitment of the AU and the sub-regional organizations to 
democracy.140 Nathan argues that the organizations have often compromised democracy, 
condoned undemocratic power-sharing arrangements, endorsed undemocratic elections, 
annulled democratic elections, accepted the overthrow of elected governments; and legitimized 
coup leaders.141 In his study, Nathan shows the weakness and inefficiencies among the RECs 
in upholding democratic values. On democratic elections, Nathan analyses the case of SADC 
region. In this case, an electoral dispute arose in Zimbabwe as a result of the 2008 presidential 
elections. SADC appointed a mediator for Zimbabwe. The mediator, former South Africa’s 
President, Thabo Mbeki, endorsed the undemocratic election.142 Thus, resulting in the failure 
of the region in delivering its mandate for respect, promotion and protection of electoral 
democracy as stipulated in its founding documents. 
Christof, in his work ECOWAS and the Restoration of Democracy in The Gambia examines 
particularly ‘the role played by the ECOWAS in resolving electoral disputes in the Gambia’.143 
This study shows the importance of RECs in election management. Following the disputed 
December 2016 presidential elections in the Gambia,144 Christof argues that ‘ECOWAS 
managed to “restore democracy” in the country by using the threat of force, but without any 
use of direct physical violence.’145 In addition, according to the author, both the African Union 
and the United Nations Security Council backed ECOWAS, which also gave the latter 
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legitimacy in carrying out the mandate.146 The study makes a good starting point on the role of 
RECs in upholding legitimate electoral processes in Africa.  Therefore, in this study, the 
ECOWAS will be used as a good comparable case study on the role of RECs in upholding 
credibility and legitimacy of electoral processes. 
Ola and Babalola in their work, Missions with Hindrance: African Union and Peacekeeping 
Operations, provide a detailed analysis on the role of RECs in conflict management.147 
However, the article does not get into any detail regarding the electoral processes and their 
effect on democracy. This study fills the gap and explains the implications of electoral disputes 
on democracy. 
Cordenillo and Ellis in their analysis of the RECs argue that ‘election-related initiatives by 
regional organizations vary enormously across regions’.148 Their initiatives vary according to 
contexts, historical, political and economic situations in which regional organizations operate. 
These determine the RECs mandates to act in the field of elections.149 Despite the above 
differences, this study argues that regional organizations can play an important role in 
promoting and protecting the integrity of democratic elections. Some regional organizations 
such as SADC, have clear guidelines on election observation and assistance.150 They play a 
critical role in promoting and protecting the integrity of these elections.151 Cordenillo and Ellis 
further argue that the initiatives of RECs range from Election Observation to technical 
assistance at the national and local levels, in line with their respective mandates and the 
legitimacy that they draw from their member states.152 RECs are also responsible with fostering 
election related dialogues among states.153 They serve as a platform for the discussion of 
various transnational economic, political and social issues.154  Although this study is broad,  it 
recognises the importance of RECs on election related dialogues. The result is cooperation 
among states in conducting democratic elections, hence the objectives of this study. 
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The study from UNDP’s Maendeleo Policy Forum examines the role of RECs on democratic 
elections. The study shows that within the RECS ‘regional leaders under regional integration 
arrangements are taking a more active role in ensuring peaceful leadership transitions. For 
instance, the African Union, the East African Community (EAC) and the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have led mediation efforts to resolve political 
crises following elections.155 This study seeks to draw possible lessons from comparing the 
SADC and ECOWAS regions on how they have been effective in carrying out their mandates. 
Nguyen evaluates the responsibility of RECs and sets some criteria on their role in conflict 
management, including electoral disputes. Nguyen argues that RECs must meet ‘four 
conditions to play an active and effective role in conflict management. These conditions are 
legitimacy, enforcement, resources and cooperation with the UN and other bodies.156 A lesson 
drawn from Nguyeni’s argument is the importance of the principle of subsidiarity among RECs 
and the higher bodies.  
Sisk and Reynolds in the book, Elections and conflict management in Africa show the exact 
nature of electoral related conflict in Africa. The book gives a deeper and comprehensive 
understanding on the nature of elections, their limitations and how they can be used to stop 
conflict within member states.157 However, the book seems not to focus on the role of RECs 
on elections and conflict management. Goodwin-Gill GS in the book, Free and fair elections 
discuss the concept of free and fair elections. The author shows global developments leading 
to the establishment of international best practices on electoral democracy. However, this study 
does not adequately focus on the role of RECs as instruments for the realization of electoral 
democracy.158 
The study conducted by Tikikel Alemu entitled, The African Charter on Democracy, Elections 
and Governance : A Normative Framework for Analysing Electoral Democracy in Africa,159 
provides a deep analysis of how the new ACDEG can be used to promote legitimate and 
credible elections in Africa.160 However, little reference is given to the RECs. This study 
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follows work by Musarurwa, entitled Creating Sustainable Democracy in Africa: An African 
Supranational Body for The Effective Supervision of Elections in Africa that ‘Africa needs to 
go a step further by establishing a supervisory body for elections that will fulfil the aspirations 
in the ACDEG’.161  
Various institutions have done extensive studies on RECs in international peace and security. 
Several articles on ECOWAS and the SADC regions are also available on internet and 
newspapers but are more based on facts than legal analysis. However, the role of RECs on 
democratic elections has not been adequately explored. A comparison of the ECOWAS and 
SADC region will shed light and help fulfil the aims and answer questions of this study. This 
study seeks to draw possible lessons on the role of RECs in upholding credible and legitimate 
electoral processes.  
To conclude, it can be said that the above review shows that RECs are drivers of democratic 
processes in Africa. Some RECs within Africa have already started making progress in 
promoting and enforcing democratic values within their regions.162 Contested electoral 
processes impact democracy negatively especially in circumstances where elections are not 
credible, and legitimacy is at stake. Contested elections may potentially cause civil wars, gross 
violations of human rights and in some cases political instability. Elections should meet 
international and regional standards and ought to be conducted according to the law. The 
ECOWAS is a good example of a REC that has done respectable work in upholding democracy. 
The mandate of RECs varies from conflict prevention to mediation, international peace, 
security and democratic elections among others. This research focuses on the role of RECs in 
upholding credible and legitimate electoral processes.  
1.8 Overview of the Chapters 
In this study, Chapter One sets out the content of the research, identifies the research problem 
and outlines the methodology of the study. Chapter Two discusses the regional and normative 
framework governing democratic elections in Africa. Chapter Three discusses the case studies 
namely, the Gambia and Zimbabwe. The Chapter discusses the notion of state responsibility 
and state obligations of democratic elections. Under Chapter Three a comparison is drawn 
between the ECOWAS and SADC’s reactions to election disputes. Chapter Four analyses the 
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extent to which the RECs have supported Member States compliance with international and 
regional standards on democratic elections. The Chapter also looks at the role of RECs in 
























CHAPTER TWO: REGIONAL REGIME GOVERNING 
DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN AFRICA 
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter examines the normative framework that governs and regulates the conduct of 
democratic elections within the African Union.163  Under this framework, the role of Regional 
Economic Communities particularly on the conduct of democratic elections in Africa is 
discussed. This legal framework stipulates regional and international standards of democratic 
elections in Africa. These standards are measured and determined by this framework. More so, 
this framework does not only protect and promote democratic elections but also fosters stability 
and security in the continent.164 This Chapter considers the African Charter on Democracy, 
Elections and Governance (ACDEG) as the most authoritative instrument of the AU regulating 
democratic elections. The ACDEG also stipulates the standards upon which elections are 
measured and tested for credibility and legitimacy in Africa. 
While the ACDEG is the most comprehensive binding instrument of the AU on democratic 
governance including elections, most state parties have not complied with the Charter165 and 
other legal instruments regulating democracy and democratic elections.166 Some of the binding 
instruments of the AU related to electoral democracy include the Constitutive Act of the AU167 
and the Protocol to the Peace and Security Council.  In the past, the Peace and Security Council 
(PSC) has suspended Member States that have breached the norms and standards that are 
encapsulated in the ACDEG. Examples will be illustrated below in the Chapter.  
Non-binding instruments discussed in this chapter include: the Declaration Governing 
Democratic Elections in Africa, which forms part of the guidelines for democratic elections in 
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Africa. These instruments are discussed in relation to their effect, significance and impact on 
democratic elections in Africa. The study highlights gaps within these instruments as well. 
Lessons are also drawn on the enforcement of this legal framework. Internationally, several 
United Nations treaties put obligations on Member States to guarantee the right to vote through 
democratic elections. These treaties include the core documents which make up the 
international bill of human rights, which include the human rights provisions of the UN 
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
2.2 Constitutive Act of the AU (2001) 
The Constitutive Act of the AU is the foundational legal document of the AU. The Act 
solemnises the declaration by Africa’s leaders to uphold the ideals of the founding fathers of 
the OAU and AU. It also honours generations of Pan-Africanists on the continent and the 
diaspora to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation among the peoples of Africa 
and African States.168 The Act was adopted at the transformation of the OAU into the African 
Union.169 In addition, it was adopted as a result of the strong and genuine desire to ‘create a 
better world’ in which democracy would be developed and respected. The Constitutive Act sets 
out the codified framework under which the African Union is to conduct itself.170 As of 2019, 
all the 55 African states are signatories to the Constitutive Act.171  
The founding objectives and principles of the AU are outlined in article 3 and article 4 of the 
Constitutive Act. These include consolidation of democratic institutions and culture, good 
governance and the rule of law, promotion and protection of human rights,172 the promotion of 
democratic principles and institutions, and popular participation.173 The Constitutive Act 
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171See the ‘The Africa Governance Report-African Union’, available at 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36418-doc-eng-_the_africa_governance_report_2019_final-1.pdf, 
accessed 4 July 2019. Morocco recently re-joined the AU. 
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further condemns and rejects unconstitutional changes of governments.174 Thus, providing a 
normative direction to guide the continent on democratic consolidation.175 
The Constitutive Act represents greater commitments by Member States to promotion and 
protection of human rights than its predecessor, the Charter of the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU Charter).176 The Act is thus an ambitious document because three of its fourteen 
objectives and six of its sixteen guiding principles focus on human rights.177 Although these 
objectives and principles focus on human rights, none of them address democratic elections 
explicitly. It has been argued that, “apart from laying the basis for democratic values which 
allow for the holding of free and fair elections, the Act falls short of addressing the electoral 
problems of the continent.”178 Nevertheless, the Act provides significantly for the institutional 
avenue through which efforts to ensure free and fair elections would be realised.179 Although 
democratic elections were not explicitly addressed, the Act gives, serious commitment to 
previous international human rights instruments.180  
Furthermore, the Act is not indifferent.  In cases of grave violations of human rights, the 
amended Constitutive Act provides for the “right of the Union to intervene in a Member State 
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity.”181 
The Constitutive  Act also  offers “ possibilities to ensure conformity with the norms set out in 
the Act,”182 and that “unlike the UN Charter, the Act does not provide for expulsion of a 
Member State that persistently violates the principles, including the human rights principles, 
set out in the Act.”183 However Governments that come into power unconstitutionally may be 
suspended by the Union.184 Under this provision,  the African Union in 2019  suspended Sudan 
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from all AU activities following continued violent attacks on civilians and the refusal by 
military government to hand over power to civilians and proposed reforms including electoral 
reforms.185 
 In addition, following the disputed December 2016 presidential elections in the Gambia, both 
the African Union and the United Nations Security Council backed ECOWAS, in refusal to 
recognise Jammeh as the legitimate President of Gambia. Jammeh had initially conceded defeat 
to elections and later changed his mind and refused the outcome of the elections.186 On the role 
of RECs, the Constitutive Act article 3(I) also make provisions for the smooth coordination 
between the RECs and the AU.187 Article 3(I) reads to ‘coordinate and harmonize the policies 
between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment 
of the objectives of the Union’.188 
The AU’s commitment has been tested in a few areas such as its response to the disputed 
elections in Zimbabwe189 and Kenya,190 as well as its response to situations of grave violations 
of human rights such as in Darfur, Sudan and Libya. It has been noted that “violations of human 
rights, constitutionalism, and democracy in Zimbabwe and other African countries were not 
met by African leaders with the same condemnation and rejection as they did [in] Togo,” 
Guinea-Bissau, and Mali. 191 Thus, the Constitutive Act as a founding document of the AU 
feeds to the concept of free and fair elections although not enumerating on the concept.192  
2.3 African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance 
The 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance is the most authoritative 
and comprehensive regional legal treaty of the AU relating to democracy, elections and 
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governance.193 As of 28 June 2019, the Charter had been signed by 46 out of 55 countries of 
the AU and 34 states had ratified.194 This is the only treaty with binding obligations explicit to 
democratic elections in chapter 7 of the Charter.195 The ACDEG is anchored in the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union. The Act commits the AU Member States to participatory democracy, 
constitutionalism, rule of law, human rights, peace and security and good governance.196  
The ACDEG arose out of a concern, among other matters, that unconstitutional changes of 
government had become “one of the essential causes of insecurity, instability and violent 
conflict in Africa”.197 Therefore, the Charter underlines the determination of the Member States 
to promote and strengthen good governance, by deepening and consolidating the rule of law 
and entrenching a political culture of change of power based on the holding of regular, free, 
fair and transparent elections.198 The Africa Governance Report provides: 
By this Charter, the Member States committed themselves to the following objectives: 
promoting adherence to democracy and respect for human rights; promoting and enhancing 
adherence to the rule of law; promoting the holding of regular free and fair elections; 
prohibiting, rejecting and condemning unconstitutional changes of government in Member 
States; promoting the fight against corruption; promoting citizen participation in governance 
and accountability in the management of public affairs; promoting gender balance and equality; 
promoting best practices in the management of elections; and, enhancing cooperation between 
the AU, RECs, state parties and the international community on democracy, elections and 
governance.199 
Thus, the Charter is a consolidation of earlier commitments through various declarations and 
decisions of the O/AU 200 to ensure the success of the democratisation process on the 
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continent.201  The roots of electoral democracy in the Charter can be traced to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Article 21 (3) states that ‘the will of the people shall 
be the basis of the authority of government, this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine 
elections which shall be, by universal and equal suffrage, held by secret vote or by equivalent 
free voting procedures’.202  Several human rights instruments such as the ICCPR203, and the 
African Charter204 have reinforced the idea of democratic elections. 
The ACDEG has provisions for sanctions to states that do not comply with its standards as 
stipulated by the AU. Article 23 provides for sanctions in cases of unconstitutional change of 
governments. For example, there may be sanctions for refusal by an incumbent government to 
relinquish power to the winning party or candidate after free and fair and regular elections.205 
Under this provision the AU suspended Ivory Coast between December 2010 and April 2011. 
Ivory Coast was suspended but the incumbent regime declined to hand over power after its 
defeat in the election. 206 These provisions complement the AU sanctions regime found in other 
instruments such as the Constitutive Act of the AU.207 In this regard, a breach of the ACDEG 
could invite sanctions in terms of article 46 of the Charter itself,208 and article 23(2) and 30209 
of the AU Constitutive Act.210  
Largely, the ACDEG provides a framework of norms and principles, the strict observance of 
which would significantly reduce the risk of unconstitutional changes of governments, popular 
uprisings and conflicts arising from competition for political power on the continent.211 The 
ACDEG is, therefore, the hard law and binding regional instrument, explicitly regulating 
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elections in Africa.212 Most recently, the African Union has cited the ACDEG in its statement 
to suspend Sudan.213 
Hansungule argues that "there is a paradox by African Leaders who bind themselves to 
international human rights instruments to prevent being bound.214 This means that by signing 
international agreements, a country can remove international focus upon it as not being a 
signatory.215  Musarurwa argues that although it is essential to have firm hard law instruments 
regulating democratic elections with specificity, the failure to hold free and fair elections has 
little to do with laws.216 Failure to comply with international standards has been emphasized 
and re-emphasized in various human rights reports.217 Some scholars have also highlighted the 
lack of compliance with the Charter.218 Non-compliance is attributable not only to the weak 
African States but to the lack of enforcement within the AU and regional organizations.219 
Therefore, enforcement mechanisms are essential for regulating the smooth transfer of power.   
The ACDEG has been utilised by the Regional Economic Communities of the African Union 
in adopting their legal instruments for the protection of democratic elections. For example, 
SADC’s Principles and Guidelines for Democratic Elections,220 and the ECOWAS Protocol on 
Democracy and Good Governance contain provisions aligned with the Charter.221  
2.4 The Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council (2002/2003) 
The Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council 222  was adopted pursuant to article 
5(2) of the AU Constitutive Act. As of 15 December 2017, the Protocol had been signed by 53 
states out of 55 of the AU and ratified by 52 states.223 Its main objectives are articulated in 
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article 3 of the Protocol. The objectives are peace and security, stability, conflict resolution, 
peace building, promotion of democratic practices, good governance and human rights. 224  
Article 4 of the Protocol outlines its key principles.225 This includes ‘the right of the Union to 
intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, in accordance with 
article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act.' However, the Protocol does not have explicit provisions 
for democratic elections.  
Article 7 (g) of the Protocol to the PSC provides that the Peace and Security Council shall 
‘institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of Government takes place in a 
Member State. 226For example, Eritrea was suspended between April 2009 and January 2011 
due to its support of insurgents in Somalia. Between December 2010 and April 2011, Ivory 
Coast was suspended, but the incumbent regime declined to hand over power after its defeat in 
the election. 227 UN-France-AU force, however, forced the incumbent regime to step down and 
de jure government assumed office.228 Togo was also suspended between February and May 
2005 and the Comoros when Mohamed Taki Abdoulkarim died in office and his son 
fraudulently retained power by manipulating the election and proceeding to win another 
election in 2010.229 In Madagascar, Guinea and Niger, the PSC declared some persons in the 
military junta unqualified to contest in some elections. 230 
More so, there are cases when presidents of some significant African states such as Uganda 
and Algeria abolished the stipulated presidential terms in their constitution and held on to 
power through the manipulation of election results. In such cases, the AU-PSC lacked the 
capability to enforce sanctions against such elements for change.231The AU has sent observers 
to monitor elections in several African countries such as Sudan and Somalia. The PSC has 
resolved post-election violence in Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire.232  The PSC, since its first meeting 
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in 2004, has deployed AU missions to conflict zones,233 for instance, the Comoros, Burundi 
(2003–2004), Sudan, Darfur (2004–2007), Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire and 
Somalia.234  
The PSC has been able to ensure that forceful military and unconstitutional government take-
overs are reverted to democratic rule for better democratic consolidation and good governance 
in Africa. Some of the cases where this has been done include Guinea and Mauritania in 2008, 
Madagascar in March 2009 and Burkina Faso in 2015. Offending Member States were also 
suspended from the AU. They were given about 6 months to conform to its constitution. When 
positive changes are not recorded, due to the obstinate attitude of some states, the PSC has had 
to engage more coercive means of sanction regimes to ensure compliance. Sanctions, such as 
travel bans and freezing of regime assets, have been imposed on the individuals tagged as 
conflict instigators.235 The sanctions are to cause a change for positive political behaviours and 
be a substitute for armed conflict and stigmatise the target.   
The AU PSC has also managed negotiations and talks within states to facilitate power sharing 
agreements especially in conflicts resulting from election disputes. Cases where AU had 
monitored power-sharing arrangements include Sudan, Ivory Coast, Chad and Zimbabwe 
(2008–2009), Libya and Liberia (1994–2003), Côte d’Ivoire (2002–2007) and Central African 
Republic (1996–2007)236 
2.5 African Union Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in 
Africa, (2002) 
On the management of elections, state parties must adhere to the AU Declaration on the 
Principles Governing Elections in Africa of 2002 (Declaration on Elections). The Declaration 
seeks to strengthen the role of the Union in observing elections and advancing the 
democratization process.237 It also is comprehensive on elections and sets out guidelines for 
elections. The Declaration is more elaborate than the previous AU instruments governing 
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democratic elections in Africa because the former sets out a benchmark as to what constitutes 
free and fair elections.238 
Article II of the Declaration outlines principles of democratic elections.239 These principles 
include democratic constitutions with supportive legal documents, the doctrine of separation 
of powers, regular elections and impartial, competent, accountable electoral institutions that 
are ‘staffed by well-trained personnel and equipped with adequate logistics. The declaration 
also sets out the duties of states and the rights and obligations of citizens.240  
However, the Declaration is a soft law instrument although it carries specificity in regulating 
democratic elections. ‘Soft laws are not binding on Member States’.241 Compared to previous 
commitments, the Declaration provides for more clear and specific guidelines as to what 
constitutes free and fair elections.242 Its status as soft law and legally non-binding instrument 
leave it as a mere statement of common aspiration.243 Besides, it does not address cases of non-
compliance with the principles or how they should be handled.244  
Akin to the provisions of the Declaration are the provisions of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD). Art 7 of NEPAD undertakes to enforce with ‘renewed determination' 
the ‘inalienable right of the individual to participate through free, credible, and democratic 
political processes in periodically electing their leaders for a fixed term of office.245 The 
Ezulwini framework was also adopted to enhance democracy and prohibit unconstitutional 
changes of Government in Africa.246 The framework is also a soft law. It focussed on 
addressing unconstitutional change of governments and coups. Hence, it did not address the 
democratic elections. 
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This chapter examined the legal framework governing democratic elections in Africa. These 
include the Constitutive Act, the ACDEG, the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security 
Council and the Declaration Governing Democratic Elections in Africa. The key lessons drawn 
in this chapter are that there are enough legal norms governing democratic elections in Africa. 
It is, therefore, important for states to comply with regional and international obligations on 
democratic elections. Secondly, democratic elections are fundamental elements of human 
rights facilitating the realisation of other rights. Consequently, elections must be conducted in 
accordance with the law. For that reason, the chapter assessed the role of regional organisations 

















CHAPTER THREE: CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA AND ZIMBABWE 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous Chapter (2) discussed and examined the regional framework governing 
democratic elections in Africa.247 The framework put obligations on states to uphold credible 
and legitimate electoral processes.248 Under this framework, states have an obligation to 
comply with the provisions of the conventions or treaties they have signed and ratified.249 As 
a sign of compliance with the treaty bodies, states are obliged to respect international law and 
their domestic laws that comply with the treaty bodies.250 Regular reporting to treaty bodies is 
also a sign of commitment to uphold human rights. In practice however, commitment to human 
rights remains a challenge. This chapter discusses this challenge using the case of the Gambia 
and Zimbabwe’s disputed elections. These case studies show that the AU Member States have 
not complied and respected the regional framework on democratic elections.  
Furthermore, this chapter argues that, although electoral malpractices have been caused by 
incumbent governments, elections were contested for many years in the Gambia and Zimbabwe 
not only because of electoral malpractice by incumbent governments, but because opposition 
parties failed to prepare adequately legally and politically to avoid and prevent electoral 
malpractices by incumbent governments in these states. Thus, these states had weak opposition 
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Finally, this chapter illustrates the role and the responses of the Regional Economic 
Communities on democratic elections. The Chapter analyses and examines the disputed 
elections in the Gambia (2016), and Zimbabwe (2018).  These countries are chosen because 
they both share similar histories of election disputes. Both countries belong to two different 
RECs, therefore, comparing the role played by the ECOWAS and SADC regions enriches the 
objectives of this study.  Comparable examples will also be drawn to show the differences in 
how the RECs reacted in response to the election disputes. The response of the RECs largely 
determines the role they have played to uphold credible and legitimate elections in Africa. The 
Chapter is divided into two parts:  the first examines the election dispute in the Gambia in 2016, 
the second looks at the election dispute in Zimbabwe in 2018. In addition, the responses of 
both RECs to these elections are analyzed. Finally, the chapter concludes by showing that the 
Gambia and Zimbabwe did not comply with regional obligations on democratic elections. 
3.2 The Gambia Election Dispute (2016) 
3.2.1 Introduction and Legislative Framework 
The Republic of the Gambia is a member of the United Nations251 and the African Union.252 
The Gambia has signed and ratified many international and regional human rights instruments 
adopted by the United Nations and the African Union including those on democratic elections. 
The country has made binding international commitments to adhere to the human rights 
standards stipulated in these universal human rights documents.253 Regionally, the Gambia is 
a member of the Economic Community of West African States since 1975.254  The ECOWAS 
was initially formed to promote economic cooperation and integration in West Africa.255 
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However, since the 1990s, ECOWAS assumed a more political role following the wave of 
political reforms and the growing number of protracted domestic violent conflicts in the 
region.256 The ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance 257 was adopted to 
enhance democratic elections in the region. The Gambia is a state party to this Protocol and 
has obligations to respect democratic elections in the region. Within that country, democratic 
elections are protected under Chapter V of its Constitution.258 The legal framework governing 
democratic elections in Gambia provides an adequate basis for the conduct of elections which 
are in line with the international standards of democratic elections. 259 
3.2.2 The Context of Pre 2016 Elections Dispute 
The dispute over the 2016 Gambian elections is best understood by considering the context of 
the Gambia in 2016 and before. The Republic of Gambia, under President Yahya Jammeh, had 
a history of authoritarianism and gross abuses of human rights.260 Several reports have pointed 
to these abuses.261  Human rights organizations in and outside the Gambia had repeatedly 
reported the high level of systematic human rights violations, torture, the disappearance of 
journalists and activists, and the general atmosphere of intimidation in the country.262 Jammeh 
came into power through a bloodless coup in 1994 263 and was officially elected President in 
1996 and consolidated his rule and grip on power.264 Furthermore, he was re-elected in 2001, 
2006, and 2011.265 However, these elections were contested and were generally not in line with 
international standards of ‘free and fair’ elections.266 During his reign, Jammeh was popularly 
known for his widely quoted interview with the BBC that he would ‘rule this country for one 
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billion years […] if Allah says so’.267  In brief, Jammeh’s rule was characterised by the lack of 
respect for human rights. 
3.2.3 Election Dispute (2016) 
In 2016, the Republic of the Gambia went to the polls. The incumbent President Jammeh lost 
the elections to Mr. Adama Barrow the opposition leader.268 The results showed that the 
opposition Mr, Adama Barrow, had garnered 45.5% of total votes,269 while Mr. Jammeh, the 
incumbent President had received 36.6%.270 In reaction to the opposition victory, President 
Jammeh immediately conceded defeat. In a public speech President Jammeh congratulated the 
opposition leader Mr. Adama Barrow. He promised, to provide guidance on power transition 
and when selecting a government.271 The Africa Union and the Economic Community of West 
African States congratulated the people of the Gambia for peaceful, free, fair and transparent 
presidential elections.272 The country had shown commitment to democracy.273  
Contrary to the provisions of the Gambian Constitution and the regional laws governing 
democratic elections in Africa, a week after conceding defeat, Jammeh rejected the election 
results.274 He stated that he no longer had trust in the electoral process given the irregularities 
in aggregating results in one of the regions.275 Jammeh cited irregularities in the election and 
unilaterally called for its annulment.276  He therefore refused to step down. 277   
After his refusal to step down, and refusal to comply with the electoral laws and the 
constitution, Jammeh deployed troops on the streets of Banjul. This was to maintain control of 
the security apparatus. The army occupied the offices of the Electoral Commission, and staff 
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was hindered from entering the building. There was no sign of handing over power to the 
President elect.278 Consequently, an estimated number of 45,000 Gambians fled to 
neighbouring Senegal and Guinea, including the President-elect Mr. Barrow. The Gambian 
security forces arrested soldiers perceived as loyal to Mr.  Barrow, the opposition leader. 
Independent radio stations were closed. Opposition supporters were detained.279 
 On the other hand, the political establishment surrounding President Jammeh  crumbled.280  
For example, his government officials deserted their posts and the head of the Electoral 
Commission went into hiding after announcing the results of the election. The Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court refused to hear Jammeh’s case challenging election results.281 Several 
human rights groups accused Jammeh of human rights abuses and urged the international 
community to stand by Mr. Barrow, the opposition leader. 282  
3.2.4 The Reaction of ECOWAS and Mediation in the Region 
In reaction to Jammeh’s refusal to step down, the ECOWAS stood by President-elect Mr. 
Barrow. ECOWAS leaders decided to send a mediation commission to Banjul to talk to Mr. 
Jammeh. The acting ECOWAS chairperson headed the delegation to Banjul on December 13, 
2016, together with the presidents of Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone and the UN Special 
Representative for West Africa. Despite the high-ranking composition (comprising all 
Anglophone heads of State within ECOWAS), the commission did not manage to convince 
Mr. Jammeh to step down. 283 Their first mediation attempt failed.  
3.2.5 Failure of Mediation 
ECOWAS leaders in their attempts to mediate the election dispute, were convinced that they 
needed to adopt more credible sanctions.284At their regular summit on December 17, 2016, in 
Abuja, the leaders decided that ECOWAS would continue mediation efforts through President 
Buhari of Nigeria and President Mahama of Ghana. The heads of State agreed to attend the 
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inauguration of President-elect Barrow, to be sworn in Senegal on January 19, 2017, in 
conformity with the Gambian Constitution.285 The heads of State also agreed that the 
ECOWAS would be obliged to take all necessary means to enforce the results of the elections 
strictly.286 ECOWAS placed standby forces on alert and formally authorized them to intervene 
using the military if President Jammeh did not step down.287 Further negotiations between 
President Buhari and President Jammeh in Banjul ended on January 13 without any 
breakthrough. As the deadline of mediation in January 18 approached, the option of military 
intervention became the solution. 288 
3.2.6 Military Intervention in the Gambia 
On January 18, troops from Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, and Togo moved towards the border 
with the Gambia. 289 In the afternoon of January 19, Adama Barrow was sworn in as President 
in the Gambian embassy in Dakar, Senegal under the sponsorship of ECOWAS and in the 
presence of many international diplomats.290 The same day, the UN Security Council 
unanimously approved Resolution 2337.291 The Resolution expressed its full support for 
ECOWAS's ‘to ensure, political stability and honour the will of the people of The Gambia as 
shown in the election results’. 292 On the same day, some troops invaded the Gambian territory, 
but a last-minute negotiation by Mauritania and Guinea Presidents quickly halted the invasion. 
The imminent threat of military aggression caused thousands of Gambians to flee to Senegal. 
Jammeh's army chief pledged his allegiance to President Barrow. Most of Jammeh’s cabinet 
resigned.293 As a result, Jammeh eventually agreed to step down and go into exile.294 The 
ECOWAS contingents then secured Gambian territory, and it was decided that ECOMOG 
would stay for a further three months in Gambia to ensure peace and stability, as requested by 
President Barrow.295 
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3.2.7 Lessons Learnt 
There are many lessons learnt from this case. Firstly, Jammeh’s actions were contrary to the 
provisions of article 23 of ACDEG which prohibits incumbent governments from refusal to 
step down after losing to an election.296 From the facts presented in this study, Jammeh’s 
actions were, therefore, illegal because they were contrary to the ACDEG and the Gambian 
constitution. They were unlawful because President Jammeh had no jurisdiction to annul the 
election and call for a fresh election. His actions show that there was no separation of powers 
in the Gambia during his time.  In addition, President Jammeh did not follow the due process 
of filing an election petition. Instead, he rejected and called for fresh elections. Furthermore, 
Mr. Jammeh went on to militarise the country and to capture state institutions. All these actions 
were undemocratic, forceful and not in line with the regional laws on elections and the 
constitution of the Gambia. 
Second, in his attempt to retain and maintain power, President Jammeh violated many human 
rights of the Gambians. For example, he arrested opposition members, violating their rights to 
freedom of movement, freedom of liberty, freedom from slavery and torture and freedom of 
opinion and expression. Third, Mr. Jammeh’s refusal to step down did not reflect the will of 
the people of the Gambia as stipulated by the law.297 
More so, the reaction by the ECOWAS of military intervention in the Gambia shows the 
importance of the role the RECs may play in upholding democracy and rule of law among 
Member States. The military intervention by the ECOWAS troops forced Jammeh to comply 
with the region. Without the military, Jammeh could not have stepped down. This shows the 
important role the regional troops may play in enforcing democracy among states. Most 
importantly, the Gambians played an important role and made it possible to restore democracy 
in the Gambia. For example, the Chief Justice went into hiding and refused to hear Jammeh’s 
case. This also showed non-tolerance to violations of democratic elections. The Military 
generals also played a key role by recognising the opposition leader as the new president. The 
recognition fast tracked Jammeh’s losing grip of power. 
Therefore, RECs can be authentic key drivers for democracy as demonstrated in the case of the 
Gambia. Although the ECOWAS had considered mediation to solve the election dispute, as 
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one of the most important peaceful ways of conflict resolution, the approach could not force 
Jammeh to comply with the electoral regulations. Regional unity is also a very important 
instrument to regulate respect for human rights. Member states of the ECOWAS took the 
initiative and contributed troops for the restoration of Democracy in the Gambia. The 
ECOWAS leaders such as Buhari of Nigeria among others, showed good statesmanship by not 
condoning the illegal actions of President Jammeh. However, although the troops had started 
invading the Gambia, the ECOWAS continued to prioritise and value mediation. The act shows 
how the region valued the importance of mediation.  
Finally, coordination was shown between the African Union and the United Nations Security 
Council which backed ECOWAS and gave it legitimacy in restoring democracy in Gambia. 298 
Thus, it remains an important lesson to learn from the Gambian case that only when the 
scenario of military invasion became credible did the Gambian regime accept the defeat.  
3.2.8 Comparable Cases within the ECOWAS 
Having examined the 2016-17 Gambia disputed election and the reaction by the ECOWAS, 
this part provides an analysis of other scenarios of contested elections within the ECOWAS 
Region. For instance, in the 2010 Ivory Coast disputed elections, the incumbent Gbagbo 
refused to concede defeat and to relinquish power after losing elections. The incumbent argued 
that there was malpractice in 3 regions in his country.299 The office holder petitioned to the 
Constitutional Court (CC) for invalidation of some votes in some constituencies in the Northern 
part of the country on the ground of malpractices.300 The CC agreed with his allegations and 
invalidated some votes in the three regions dominated by the opposition.301 The international 
community did not agree and thus, recognised the results of the IEC and endorsed the 
opposition leader as the legitimate president of Ivory Coast.302  The international community 
decided to support the IEC mainly on the basis of its independence. Although the decision not 
to comply with the CC by the international community infringed on the principle of legality, 
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the justification for the decision of the International community was that, there was lack of 
separation of powers within the courts. The lack of separation of powers violates the credibility 
of the court.  As a result of the former president’s refusal to step down, ECOWAS took a hard 
line against the situation in Ivory Coast. The ECOWAS imposed sanctions on Ivory Coast and 
suspended its membership to all ECOWAS decision making bodies.303 Thus, between 
December 2010 and April 2011, Ivory Coast was suspended. Yet, the incumbent regime 
declined to hand over power after his defeat in the election.304  Apart from democratic elections, 
the ECOWAS also suspended a number of West African Countries that had acquired power 
through military coups, 305 for example, Burkina Faso in 2015.  
The ECOWAS intervened in Guinea Bissau after the disputed 2005 elections. The elections 
required intervention by the ECOWAS and the United Nations, which proved relatively more 
successful.306 Perhaps learning its lesson from Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS was much quicker to 
react to the attempts by President Mamadou Tandja of Niger who attempted to prolong his stay 
in power in 2008.307 Having failed to secure a two-thirds majority in parliament, Tanja 
organised a referendum on the extension of his term, after dissolving the Parliament and 
Constitutional Court. ECOWAS responded to these events by calling on Tandja to annul the 
elections. However, the incumbent refused to comply with the ECOWAS. The ECOWAS 
Heads of State suspended Niger’s membership and Nigeria announced that it would evaluate 
the possibility of an intervention.308 ECOWAS also sent a delegation with ministers from Cape 
Verde, Guinea, Ghana, and Nigeria to negotiate a peace agreement, which proved successful.309 
Therefore, all the above examples show that the region has fared reasonably well in its quest 
for democracy, peace and security when compared to the SADC region discussed below. 
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3.3 The Case of Zimbabwe (2018) 
3.3.1 Introduction and Legislative Framework  
The Republic of Zimbabwe is a member of the United Nations310 and the African Union.311 
Zimbabwe has signed and ratified many international and regional human rights instruments 
adopted by the United Nations and the African Union including those particular to democratic 
elections.312 The country has made binding international commitments to adhere to the human 
rights standards stipulated in these universal human rights documents.313 Recent reports  
stipulate that in 2017/18 prior to the elections, Zimbabwe had ratified six core international 
human rights treaties.314 However, three of its core international human rights treaties were still 
pending for ratification.315 In international law, ratification and implementation of human rights 
treaties demonstrate the State party’s commitment to international norms and standards of 
human rights.316 Treaties clarify what human rights mean in theory and practice. According to 
the UN reports, Zimbabwe has not complied with treaty bodies.317 In 2017, the UN reported 
that Zimbabwe’s had a backlog in reporting to treaty bodies.318  
Under the AU, Zimbabwe is a member of SADC and COMESA. SADC and COMESA were 
formed to promote economic cooperation and integration within (southern) African States.319 
However, overtime they have assumed a more political role, especially the SADC, following 
the wave of political reforms and the growing number of protracted domestic violent conflicts 
within Southern African states. To protect democratic elections, the SADC particularly has 
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adopted ‘Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections’.320 These principles, 
while not binding, are persuasive and reflect the shared values and commitments by SADC 
Member States relative to democratic governance. Though the guidelines are soft law, they are 
important because they provide a practical and normative framework for decision making and 
instil a sense of responsibility and accountability among Member States.  
The principal objective of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic 
Elections is to promote the holding and observation of democratic elections based on the shared 
values and principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights enshrined in 
the SADC Treaty signed at Windhoek, Namibia in 1992.321 For Zimbabwe, democratic 
elections are protected under chapter 7 of its constitution, 322 and the Electoral Act. 323The legal 
framework governing democratic elections in Zimbabwe’s provides adequate basis for the 
conduct of elections which are in line with the international and regional instruments. 
3.3.2 Pre- Election Dispute 
The elections in Zimbabwe have been highly controversial because they have been disputed 
since 2002.324 Connected to democratic elections is Zimbabwean politics which has been 
unstable for almost two decades.325  The most recent highly disputed elections are the 2008, 
2013 and 2018 general and presidential elections.326  
The disputed elections in Zimbabwe have often led to gross violations of human rights. 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have often cited deterioration of conditions 
of human rights in Zimbabwe.327 The European Union, and the United Nations observer 
missions similarly argued that the Zimbabwean elections failed to meet international minimum 
standards in all its elections since 2002.328 Other human rights groups have constantly reported 
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on gross violations of human rights. These include torture, repression of fundamental rights 
and freedoms, adoption of oppressive laws, killings, imprisonment and disappearance of 
political activists.329 The government of Zimbabwe has often deliberately disregarded the rights 
and provisions in the country’s constitution. 330  
3.3.3 Systematic History of Disputed Elections in Zimbabwe 
The causes of election disputes in Zimbabwe are systemic. All election outcomes in Zimbabwe 
since 2002, 2008, 2013 and 2018 have been subject to contestation. 331 These elections have 
been flawed mainly because of the institutional challenges within the governance of Zimbabwe. 
Dube argues that elections in Zimbabwe have been long contested as a result of deep-rooted 
institutional problems within the governance structures of the country. 332 Opposition leaders, 
mainly the Movement of Democratic Change (MDC), have often accused the ruling party 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU PF) for election manipulation and rigging.  
Contestations over elections in Zimbabwe have undermined the credibility of elections. Many 
Zimbabwean’s have lost trust and confidence in the electoral processes. Every election dispute 
has affected the confidence and trust people have with the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission 
(ZEC).  Most of Zimbabwe’s election disputes have spilt into the courts for recourse. However, 
the courts have always ruled in favour of the ZANU PF, the ruling party.  
Dube argues that the courts in Zimbabwe have been heavily and systematically politicised by 
the ruling party.333  For example, in Tsvangirai v Mugabe and Another334 the MDC has lost all 
the court cases, with the 2002 presidential challenge judgment yet to be released.335 In 2008, 
the credibility of the presidential election was undermined by the delay in announcing the 
results of the March 29' First Round' election. The election’s result was delayed with over 60 
days.336 The delay was unreasonable and led to lack of trust and confidence with the Zimbabwe 
Electoral Commission. Therefore, the MDC, the main opposition party, filed an urgent 
chamber application before the High Court. In Movement for Democratic Change and Another 
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v Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and Another (2008)337, Judge Uchena 
ruled that Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) had acted within the parameters of section 
67A in the conduct of elections.  Therefore, the judge dismissed the MDC's application. The 
Zimbabwe electoral commission declared no winner of the election and called for a runoff.338 
The court’s decision left many opposition leaders and Zimbabweans dissatisfied and lacking 
trust in the judiciary. Since the court declared no winner, on June 27, 2008, a runoff election 
was held. The atmosphere was not conducive for free and fair elections. 339 Mugabe came 
victorious and the outcome was again highly contested.340 
The SADC region endorsed the credibility of the elections even though the elections were 
marked with extreme violence.341 On the contrary, the independent groups such as the 
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights reported that these elections did not meet minimum 
international standards.342 The elections were characterised by extreme violence, political 
intimidation, arrest of political activists, and torture, among others.343  
In 2013, presidential elections were due. Zimbabwe went to polls. However, the climate for 
free and fair elections was absent.344 It is reported that the political situation was violent similar 
to 2008 elections.345 It is also argued that President Mugabe repeated his tactics of previous 
years.346  The major opposition party withdrew from the elections two weeks before the 
Election Day347. There were allegations of the lack of transparency and unwillingness to 
facilitate significantly needed electoral reforms. As a result, Mugabe won a one-person 
competition.348 The legitimacy and credibility of these elections remained disputed. 
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3.3.4 Zimbabwe 2018 Elections Dispute 
Unlike the Gambia, the case of Zimbabwe is deeply complex and systemic. One election 
dispute has led to another. Therefore, the 2018 presidential elections in Zimbabwe cannot be 
understood in isolation. It is difficult to discuss the 2018 disputed elections in Zimbabwe 
without making reference to the systemic history of contested elections in the country, 
especially the 2008 and 2013 elections. In 2018, after the military coup, Zimbabwe went to 
polls to elect a new government. However, the elections were tightly contested between the 
ruling party (Zanu PF) and the main opposition (the MDC Alliance). Unlike the previous years, 
the 2018 pre-election campaign was reported to be relatively peaceful from the outlook. 349 
The election dispute arose prior to the announcement of the election results350 and after the 
election results were announced.351 Violence broke out. 352 Members of the opposition party 
rejected the results. Protests started in the capital city led by opposition members.353 These 
protests were followed by a military crackdown on political opponents.354 The military shot 
and killed at least six people during opposition protests in the capital Harare. 355 Several people 
were injured.356 The military crackdown on civilians were widely condemned by the opposition 
leaders and the international community. 357   
Subsequently, the opposition MDC Alliance leader Nelson Chamisa challenged the election 
results announced by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. ZEC had declared Mnangagwa the 
winner after polling 50.8 percent of the vote against Chamisa with 44.3 percent.358 The 
opposition leader filed a case to the Constitutional Court, alleging that ZEC had manipulated 
the votes in favour of Mnangagwa. In his application, Chamisa cited Mnangagwa, ZEC and 21 
other presidential candidates as respondents. 
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In Chamisa v Mnangagwa & 24 Others, 359 Chamisa cited irregularities by the Zimbabwe 
Electoral Commission. ZEC had announced several (3 times) conflicting results.360 Therefore, 
it was difficult to know the actual result of the elections. These conflicting results fuelled the 
lack of trust and confidence with the electoral commission. More so, these results affected the 
relationship between the people and the electoral commission. Critical to understand the 2018 
elections in Zimbabwe is the role and image of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. The 
conduct of ZEC in announcing several conflicting results led to unrest, conflict and the lack of 
trust from the general public, especially opposition members.  
Therefore, in Chamisa v Mnangagwa & 24 Others,361 the MDC argued for the nullification of 
the election results, on the basis that Mnangagwa had narrowly won the election and there were 
many mathematical irregularities regarding the election result. Furthermore, the MDC argued 
that the election results did not reflect the will of the people. Apart from mathematical 
irregularities, the MDC also pointed out the politicization of the ZEC and its members 
including the chair of the Electoral Commission.362 However, the court, despite all the 
irregularities, declared Mnangagwa the winner of the election in terms of section 93(4) (a) of 
the Constitution of Zimbabwe.363 The Court insisted that the irregularities of the Zimbabwe 
Electoral Commission did not affect the outcome of the election. Thus, the Court concluded 
that it is an internationally accepted principle of election disputes that an election is not set 
aside easily, merely on the basis that an irregularity occurred.364  
3.3.5 History of the Reaction of SADC to Elections Results in Zimbabwe 
The Zimbabwe election disputes have presented the SADC region with many challenges 
stretching back as early 2000s. For example, in 2004, SADC election observers were 
considered to have harmed the credibility of elections in Mozambique. The poll, although 
contested, was declared free and fair prematurely by the SADC observers.365 This caused 
dissatisfaction among the electorates in Mozambique. The same was repeated in Zimbabwe in 
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2005. SADC endorsed an election process that was already flawed with heavy restrictions on 
freedom of assembly and the clamping down on the independent media.366 
In the case of Zimbabwe, SADC has a history of congratulating the government of Zimbabwe 
after fraudulent and contested elections.367 For example, in a communiqué issued by SADC 
following the extraordinary SADC summit held on 28-29 March 2007 in Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania, SADC recalled that the Zimbabwe’s election of 2002 was democratic, free and fair 
and the summit reaffirmed its solidarity with the government and the people of Zimbabwe.368 
SADC endorsed these elections despite the fact that the opposition, mainly the MDC had 
lamented that the election was unfair and fraudulent.369 
In 2008 Zimbabwe contested elections, SADC remained silent until the matter was discussed 
by the AU at its ordinary session in Sharm El-Sheikh in Egypt from 30 June - 1 July 2008. The 
AU decided that mediation of the crisis be vested into SADC.370  Thus, SADC had not made 
any initiative except the AU. 371 Subsequently, following the recommendations of the AU, 
SADC appointed Thabo Mbeki as a mediator of the crisis in Zimbabwe. However, SADC did 
not issue any public criticism against the 2008 election which was marred by a lot of 
irregularities.372 SADC abstained not only from stopping the recognition of Mugabe as the 
lawful head of Zimbabwe, but also from preventing him from attending the SADC summit held 
in Johannesburg, South Africa on 17 August 2008 and other subsequent summits.373 
SADC’s involvement in Zimbabwe’s crisis was not in vain. Its sponsored mediation, led by 
Thabo Mbeki, led to the Global Political Agreement (GPA) which resulted in the formation of 
the Government of National Unity (GNU) which was signed on 15 September 2008.374 SADC 
did not act to address the situation in Zimbabwe despite some SADC members openly 
criticising Mugabe’s regime. For example, Botswana openly criticised Mugabe and declined 
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to recognise him as the legitimate leader of Zimbabwe following the 2008 disputed election.375 
SADC, for many years, has been criticised for its unwillingness to openly condemn ZANU-
PF’s government in Zimbabwe on human rights issues generally and on the recurring flawed 
electoral processes.376 
3.3.6 SADC Reaction to Zimbabwe Elections in 2018 
The 2018 elections in Zimbabwe were received with controversy and violence.377 The disputed 
elections were followed by a military crackdown on political opponents. The military shot and 
killed at least six people during opposition protests in the capital, Harare, after the 
announcement of the result.  378 While the Zimbabwe military was killing people, SADC, the 
African Union and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa all officially endorsed 
Zimbabwe’s election as credible, free and fair.379 The SADC Election Observer Mission 
(EOM) stated that the election ‘represented a political watershed and a positive change in 
politics in the history of the country’.380 According to the SADC Chair ‘the elections were in 
conformity with the SADC Treaty, the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security 
Cooperation and the revised SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections 
(2015)’.381 Therefore, the elections were considered legal and legitimate. For the African 
Union, former Ethiopian Prime Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, described the election as an 
occasion that “marked an important moment in the democratic transition” in Zimbabwe.382   
COMESA also stated that, the election had offered an “important opportunity to build on a new 
foundation”.383 However, no steps were taken by the SADC region regarding the 2018 military 
crackdown, death and many injuries of civilians upon the announcement of election results. As 
a result of the pre- mature announcement of election results by the SADC region, the Nordic 
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African Centre for Local Democracy warned that it was still too early to really pass comment 
on the election.384   
The European Union delegation, tasked with observing Zimbabwe elections, released a 
preliminary report, citing that the political climate had improved, unlike the previous years but 
however, the playing field had remained uneven.385 The elections had been marred by voter 
intimidation and an untrustworthy polling process and ultimately the military crackdown on 
civilians.  Although these recommendations were favourable, they point to institutional 
problems within the context of SADC.386 Unlike the ECOWAS, the SADC’s endorsement of 
the disputed election remains a concern and a threat to democratization.  
3.3.7 Other Comparable Cases in the SADC Region 
In 2004, SADC election observers prematurely endorsed Mozambique’s polls.387 In 
Zimbabwe, elections 2008, 2013 and 2018 have been the same.  Similar challenge was found 
in the DRC elections of 2018. The SADC election monitors also endorsed the ‘Democratic 
Republic of Congo’s presidential elections which were heavily contested’.388  The 2018 DRC 
elections were supposed to have been held in 2017. Kabila refused to stepdown and postponed 
elections for over a year, very little was done from SADC to uphold the rule of law and 
democracy in the DRC.389  Prior to the elections, SADC sent Electoral Advisory (SEAC) and 
Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC Countries (ECF-SADC) to conduct a Joint Electoral 
Assessment Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to assess the electoral 
administration capacity and technical needs of the National Independent Electoral Commission 
(CENI) ahead of the country’s anticipated national elections in December 2018.390 However, 
this was insufficient, the elections were later disputed.391 
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 In Malawi (2019) the SADC alongside COMESA Electoral Observation Mission endorsed the 
election outcome in its preliminary statement. The SADC reported the peaceful political and 
security environment that existed before, during and immediately after polling day.392 
However, the elections were disputed by the opposition parties and the voters.393 The court also 
annulled the election result after finding gross errors and irregularities from the Malawi 
Electoral Commission (MEC) and the court called for fresh elections.394 
3.3.8 Lessons Learnt 
There are lessons learnt from the failures or challenges of the SADC region.  First, the SADC 
region has not been proactive on election disputes. Secondly, opposition parties within SADC 
Member States have been weak in their legal and political strategies to prevent electoral 
malpractices in the region. Strong opposition parties have ways and strategies to win political 
power despite the challenges posed by incumbent regimes. In SADC, this study shows that 
opposition parties have always been victims of political injustices and have failed to provide 
alternatives to these injustices.   
In addition, critical to this study is the view that SADC Member States have been condoning 
electoral malpractices within the region. The case of Zimbabwe presents a good picture of the 
lack of political will among SADC Member States to hold the Zimbabwean government 
accountable. The lack of appropriate responses on the Zimbabwean case from SADC has led 
to several disputed elections in the region. The SADC observer mission has always endorsed 
contested and fraudulent elections. This has also been a drawback to democratization. Unlike 
the ECOWAS, the SADC remains lacking enforcement mechanisms to protect democratic 
elections. As pointed out by scholars in this study, the region remains highly politicised which 
makes democratization on the region a big challenge.  
3.3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the Gambia and Zimbabwe have contested elections for a number 
of years. This has been a result of a number of reasons.  First the incumbent governments did 
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not respect human rights. The lack of political and electoral reforms in these states led to 
election disputes. The lack of these reforms has been a true reflection of dictatorship in these 
two countries. Second, opposition parties were too weak to prevent electoral malpractices. 
Hence, there was a cycle of contested elections for many years in these two countries. Third, 
the chapter has shown the role played by the RECs in the Gambia (2016), and Zimbabwe (2018) 
disputed elections. Comparable examples on the work of RECs have been discussed. The 
Chapter shows that RECs have made good attempts to improve democracy in their regions 
despite the shortcomings and challenges faced.  The chapter has also compared the ECOWAS 
and SADC regions response to election disputes. The chapter concludes that between the two 
regions, the SADC remains a challenged region democratically, while the ECOWAS has done 














CHAPTER FOUR:  THE ROLE OF REGIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN UPHOLDING CREDIBILITY AND 
LEGITIMACY OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN AFRICA 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the role of the Regional Organizations (RECs) in upholding credibility 
and legitimacy of electoral processes in Africa. To achieve this, the chapter first demonstrates 
that RECs are critical stakeholders in ensuring credible and legitimate elections within AU 
Member States. RECs have helped Member States comply with their international legal 
commitments on democratic elections.395 For example, the ECOWAS have dealt with 
protection of electoral processes in the case of the Gambia in 2016 through a military 
intervention when the incumbent President refused to step down from power.396   
Second, the RECs have dealt with election disputes through political dialogues, negotiations 
and mediations. For instance, in the case of Zimbabwe 2008, the SADC region facilitated 
negotiations, mediation and political dialogue to political parties in Zimbabwe. This facilitation 
led to a power sharing agreement.397 This power sharing agreement led to increased political 
participation to opposition parties in Zimbabwe. Third, the chapter shows that RECs are 
protecting democratic elections through election monitoring and observation.398 Election 
observation is important to ensure the integrity of the election. Election observation can be an 
effective detector and deterrent of integrity and legitimacy problems.399 Through election 
observation RECs provide recommendations to States on their conduct of democratic elections. 
Although election monitoring and observation are important, this chapter highlights existing 
challenges by Election Monitoring Bodies (EMB) established by the RECs.400 
 
395G Lynch & G Crawford ‘Democratization in Africa 1990-2010: An Assessment’ (2011). 
396 ECOWAS Final Communiqué: 50th Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and 
Government, Abuja: ECOWAS. (2016). 
397 T Mukuhlani ‘Zimbabwe’s Government of National Unity: Successes and Challenges 
in Restoring Peace and Order’ Journal of Power, Politics & Governance June 2014, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 169-180 
398 The SADC Election Observer Mission is a good example where RECs are involved in election observation. 
399 International Election Observation ,’ACE Electoral Knowledge Celebrating twenty years of 
sharing electoral knowledge’, available at: https://aceproject.org/electoral-advice/election-
observation/international-election-observation, accessed 2 November 2019. 
400 Election observation is not an end in itself. If observation is to have a meaningful impact, the underlying 
intention must be to assist participating States in implementing their election-related commitments and 




Fourth, RECs also protect elections through regional their courts and tribunals.401 The REC 
courts and tribunals play an important role in protecting, individuals and corporate on 
violations of their human rights. Their decisions are binding and must be respected by the 
States. Linked to the work of REC courts and tribunals is the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), which is a quasi-judicial body tasked with promoting and 
protecting human rights and collective (peoples') rights throughout the African continent as 
well as interpreting the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and considering 
individual complaints of violations of the Charter.402 
Fifth, this chapter demonstrate that human rights are interdependent and interconnected.403 
Therefore, the right to vote is connected and related to several human rights. No human right 
can be enjoyed in isolation. When democratic elections are protected, several human rights are 
protected too. The right to vote promote and protect a whole range of human rights and 
freedoms which includes the political participation of women, youth and vulnerable groups in 
governance of their country. It is through the right to vote that citizens and opposition parties 
can express their different opinions and freely challenge governance views about their country. 
Through the right to vote, the sovereignty of a people is enhanced.  This right also affirms 
people’s right to self-determination. Finally, this Chapter shows that, while RECs demonstrate 
commitment to ensure credible and legitimate elections in their regions. However, in practice 
States often fail to comply with the REC’s obligations.404 States also often fail to report 
timeously to the treaty bodies. Moreover, in some cases, states have failed to ratify treaty 
provisions to improve human rights and democratic elections in their domestic laws.405 As a 
result, human rights are affected.  
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that these recommendations are given serious consideration and effectively addressed. If they are not, there is 
a real risk that electoral shortcomings and vulnerabilities will persist and, in all likelihood, increase. 
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4.2 The Role of RECs in Promoting Credibility and Legitimacy of Elections 
RECs are critical stakeholders in ensuring credible and legitimate elections within AU Member 
States. To achieve this, RECs have enacted instruments that complement the instruments of the 
AU in the protection of democratic elections.406 RECs have provided the platform upon which 
elections are freely conducted.407 To ensure credibility and legitimacy of elections, RECs have 
supported Member States to comply with their international legal commitments.  For example, 
in 2016, when the incumbent President of the Gambia refused to stepdown after losing 
elections,408 the ECOWAS took an active role to facilitate mediation in view to convince the 
President to step down and uphold constitutionalism.409 Critical to this case is that all the 
mediation efforts failed, and the ECOWAS was left with no option but to resort to the use of 
force.410 Although the use of force is contested under international law, in certain circumstances 
as in the case of the Gambia force was necessary to restore constitutional order and to uphold 
the election result. In addition, it is with the use of force that the legitimacy of the election 
result was restored and safeguarded. Therefore, the use of force, where necessary, is acceptable 
and has been implemented in view to uphold legitimacy and credibility of elections as 
evidenced in the case of the Gambia.  
Linked to the work of RECs is the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU. The PSC is 
the principal decision-making body for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts 
on the African continent. It is primarily entrusted with enforcing the normative framework of 
the AU. Article 7 (g) of the Protocol to the PSC provides that the Peace and Security Council 
shall ‘institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of Government takes place in a 
Member State.’411 RECs have protected democratic elections by use of sanctions to 
governments that have violated democratic elections. An example was 2010 when the 
incumbent President of Ivory Coast refused to step down after losing elections and declined to 
hand over power.412 The ECOWAS took a hard line against the situation in Ivory Coast. The 
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ECOWAS imposed sanctions on Ivory Coast and suspended its membership to all ECOWAS 
decision making bodies.413 Similarly, the ECOWAS also suspended Niger and halted economic 
and bilateral assistance to the uranium-producing nation in 2009 after ex-President Mamadou 
Tandja changed the constitution to extend his rule.414 
Also, the ECOWAS suspended Guinea in 2009 following a bloody crackdown by security 
forces on protesters and included an arms embargo. Guinea was suspended as a result of the 
military junta that had seized power. The ECOWAS forced that country to hold elections and 
returned the country to democratic rule. Guinea was suspended from all the meetings of 
ECOWAS at heads of state and ministerial levels until constitutional order was restored.415  
Togo was suspended between February and May 2005 and the Comoros, when Mohamed Taki 
Abdoulkarim died in office and his son fraudulently retained power by manipulating the 
election he then proceeded to win another election in 2010.416 In Madagascar, the PSC declared 
some persons in the military junta unqualified to contest in some elections.417  In 2019, The 
African Union suspended Sudan from all AU activities following continued violent attacks on 
civilians and the refusal by military government to hand over power to civilians and to conduct 
reforms including electoral reforms.418 Based on these examples, sanctions are therefore useful 
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4.3 Mediation, Negotiations and Political Dialogue  
RECs have promoted legitimacy and credibility of electoral processes in Africa through 
mediation, negotiations and political dialogues in the event of election disputes. Over the years 
RECs have successfully managed to negotiate talks within states to facilitate power sharing 
agreements in conflicts resulting from election disputes. Cases where the RECs have facilitated 
mediation and leading to power-sharing arrangements include Sudan (2013), under the 
auspices of the sub-regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),419 Ivory 
Coast (2011)420 Chad421 Liberia422 Central African Republic (1996–2007) in post-electoral 
conflicts in Kenya (2007) and Côte d’Ivoire (2010).423 Most of these mediation efforts were 
supported by the African Union and some by the United Nations. This shows that RECs, as 
subsidiary bodies of the AU and UN, do not work in isolation.  
The SADC region has facilitated mediation, negotiations and political dialogues in the case of 
Zimbabwe (2008–2009).424 Although the mediation efforts by the SADC region in 2008 has 
been highly criticised by many, the region showed concern over violations of human rights and 
instability within the country as a result of contested elections in the country.425 Thus, these 
efforts made a difference and led to power sharing arrangements and increased political 
participation for opposition parties in Zimbabwe. Therefore, mediation, negotiation and 




419 Fabiunke, L Luke ‘Mediation outcomes from the second Sudan civil war: an analysis of Abuja and IGAD 
peace initiatives’ 2013 Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School 
420D Ouattara ‘ECOWAS and Intrastate Conflict Mediation in West Africa: The Case of Cote d’Ivoire’,2016 
University of Peace.  
421SG Amoo , IW Zartman   ‘Mediation by Regional Organizations: The Organization for African Unity (OAU) 
in Chad’ in J Bercovitch, JZ  Rubin (eds) What ended Zuma's mediation in Libya? available at 
https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/what-ended-zumas-mediation-in-libya, accessed  on 20 November 2019. 
422N Okai, M Abdallah, L Amedzrator ,S Brewoo & F Okyere .Mediating Conflict in West Africa ‘An overview 
of regional experiences’ 2014. 
423 A Mehler ‘Not Always in the People’s Interest: Power-Sharing Arrangements in African Peace Agreements 
(2012) 83 GIGA Working Papers 
424 V Kare ‘Zimbabwe: The Elections on March 29 and the later Runoff event and by-elections on June 27, 2008’. 
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights Report, Available at:   
https://www.jus.uio.no/smr/english/about/programmes/nordem/publications/2008/0808, accessed 20 July 




4.4 Elections Monitoring and Observation to Uphold Credibility and Legitimacy of 
Elections              
To enhance credibility and legitimacy of elections, RECs have been involved in pre and post 
electoral observation. These are instrumental to achieve credible and legitimate electoral 
processes in Africa. Elections must not only be free and fair; they must also be seen to be so.426 
Election observation enhances the credibility and legitimacy of elections. Through election 
observation by the RECs the electorates can express their sovereignty and their self-
determination. The concept of sovereignty and self-determination provide the basis for the 
authority and legitimacy of government.427  Election observation by the RECs also enhances 
the integrity of election processes, by deterring and exposing irregularities and fraud and by 
providing recommendations for improving electoral processes.428 
Through the RECs, election observation can promote public confidence as warranted, promote 
electoral participation and mitigate the potential for election-related conflict.429  Thus, electoral 
observation and monitoring by the RECs have become an integral part of the democratic and 
electoral processes in Africa. The work of the election observers has enhanced the transparency 
and credibility of elections and democratic governance in Africa and the acceptance of election 
results throughout the continent. In some cases, election observation and monitoring missions 
can also play a key role in diminishing conflicts before, during and after elections,430 and in 
strengthening acceptance of election outcomes and improving the legitimacy of elected 
governments.431 
Election monitoring and observation may take two main forms: (a) long-term, covering all the 
phases of the electoral process pre and post electoral audits and (b) short-term, covering mainly 
polling day activities. 432These processes are key instruments for evaluating and assessing 
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whether the electoral process in any given country has been conducted in a free, fair, 
transparent and credible manner.433  
Although the elections monitoring and observation is important for credible and legitimate 
elections, in practice the election observer Missions established by the RECs have not always 
displayed integrity in their regions. This has often compromised the legitimacy and credibility 
of elections. For example, in 2004, SADC election observers prematurely endorsed 
Mozambique’s polls.434 In Zimbabwe’s elections of 2008, 2013 and 2018, elections were 
endorsed even though there had been contestation.  Most recently, similar challenges were 
found in the DRC elections of 2018. The SADC election monitors also endorsed the DRC’s 
presidential elections, which were heavily contested.435  The 2018 DRC elections were 
scheduled to be held in 2017. Kabila refused to stepdown and postponed elections for over a 
year. SADC did very little to uphold rule of law and democracy in the DRC.436 Therefore, in 
the case of SADC the region has failed in the above-named cases to uphold the integrity of 
elections. It is important that RECs should provide accurate reports for the purpose of 
protecting the integrity of elections and their integrity as institutions.  
4.5 Protection of Human Rights and Democratic Elections 
Democratic elections are linked to a range of human rights. Human rights are interdependent 
and interrelated. They are interdependent because all rights political, civil, social, cultural and 
economic are equal in importance and none can be fully enjoyed without the others.437 Each 
one contributes to the realization of a person’s human dignity through the satisfaction of his or 
her developmental, physical, psychological and spiritual needs.438 The fulfilment of one right 
often depends, wholly or in part, upon the fulfilment of others. For example, the right to vote 
paves way to enjoyment of other rights such as the right to political participation which includes 
women, disabled and the marginalised populations. Other freedoms and rights associated to 
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this right such as freedom of assembly and freedom of expression are attained when the right 
to vote freely is attained.  
To protect these rights, RECs have established regional courts and tribunals to provide 
protection of human rights in Africa.439  The RECs Courts are charged with resolving disputes 
related to the REC’s treaty, protocols and conventions.  For example, one of the prominent 
regional courts in Africa, the ECOWAS Court, which sits in Abuja, Nigeria, has jurisdiction 
over fifteen West African countries and has, since 2005, decided several individual human 
rights cases. For instance, in Barthelemy Dias v. Republic of Senegal440 the applicant, 
Barthelemy Dias, was a popular leading member of a Senegalese opposition party. He brought 
a case after the 2011 Senegalese election, alleging that Senegalese Democratic Party (SDP) 
members had organized armed thugs to eliminate opposition leaders at the time. He claimed 
that he was a victim of their attacks on 22 December 2011, in response to which he pulled out 
a firearm and fired shots in self-defence.441  However, the court upon investigation dismissed 
all the allegations.442 
 
On the other hand, in Zimbabwe several cases were brought to the SADC Tribunal.443 The 
Tribunal’s first verdict at the end of 2008 was already a landmark case. Zimbabwe had enforced 
a highly controversial land redistribution policy in the early 1990s. 444The Tribunal decided in 
Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe that the government’s seizure of 
land owned by white farmers was indirect or ‘de facto’ discrimination and therefore 
unconstitutional and that the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation.445 Following this 
decision, Zimbabwe threatened to pull out of the SADC Tribunal, challenging its legitimacy.446  
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Although the President of Zimbabwe disrespected the tribunal leading to its suspension, the 
work of the tribunal was instrumental in protection of human rights of SADC nationals. 
Within the RECs cases of human rights violations may be referred to the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.447 The Commission accepts complaints from individuals, non-
governmental organizations, and States, concerning alleged violations of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.448 There are several cases that have been brought before the 
Commission on elections and human rights.  
In the case of Jawara v. The Gambia,449 the former head of state of the Gambia, alleged that 
the military government that unseated him violated, among other things, the right to receive 
information, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly and association.450 The 
complainant’s government was overthrown in a military coup in July 1994. According to the 
complainant, the incumbent military government had violated the African Charter of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights by, inter alia: abolishing the Gambian Constitution’s Bill of Rights; 
banning political parties and ministers of the former civilian government; killing soldiers 
affiliated with the civilian government; and arresting journalists without cause and detaining 
them without trial.451  
The arrest and detention of journalists breached Article 9 of the Charter,452 which provides for 
the right to freedom of expression.453 The government of the Gambia provided no defence to 
the allegations and the Commission concluded there was a clear violation of the right to 
freedom of expression.454 Furthermore, the Commission concluded that the arrest, detention, 
expulsion, and intimidation of journalists deprived journalists of their right to disseminate 
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opinions as well of the public of their right to information.455 The Commission emphasized that 
“the intimidation and arrest or detention of journalists for articles published and questions 
asked deprives not only the journalists of their rights to freely express and disseminate their 
opinions, but also the public, of the right to information”.456 It is important to note that the 
decisions of the Commission are not binding but persuasive to Member States.  
4.6 State Reports and Concluding-Observations 
African states are obliged to comply with treaties they have ratified pursuant to article 62 of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.457 State parties are required to submit 
reports every two years on legislative or other measures taken to give effect to the rights and 
freedoms recognised and guaranteed by the African Charter.458 It is through state reporting that 
progress in democratic elections can be assessed by the RECs and the African Commission. 
States, in their reports, stipulate how elections have been conducted in their countries. In return 
the treaty bodies such as the African Commission issue recommendations on how elections can 
be improved within a member state. It is, therefore, important that states report to treaty bodies 
so that progress may be measured on their realisation of human rights. 
The Gambia and Zimbabwe are state parties to the African Charter and are, thus, obliged to 
report periodically and timeously to the African Commission.459 Both Zimbabwe and the 
Gambia have not been consistent with reporting to the African Commission. For instance, 
Zimbabwe’s first periodic report was filed in 1991 and the second report was only filed in 
2006.460 Since 2006, Zimbabwe failed to file further reports until 2019. In 2019 Zimbabwe 
filed a combined report for the period of 2007-2019.461  The Gambia submitted a report to the 
African Commission in 1992. Its second report was submitted in 1994.462 
To enhance democratic values, including democratic elections, the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM) is another mechanism used by African States and the RECs to enhance 
democracy and good governance. The APRM was adopted as a self-monitoring instrument 
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voluntarily agreed upon by Member States of the African Union. 463 Through the APRM, states 
can carry out periodic reviews on their progress towards the realisation of human rights. The 
APRM also ensures national ownership and leadership of the review processes.464 The 
mechanism allows the RECs to contribute effectively to monitoring the progress of human 
rights and ensuring accountability. There are 38 member states to the APRM including the 
Gambia. However, Zimbabwe is not a member. 465Although the Gambia is a member state, it 
is yet to be peer reviewed. 466Through APRM, African states have the capacity and opportunity 
to review their progress on electoral reforms and implementation of democratic elections. This 
has a positive effect in enhancing credible and legitimate elections.                                                                                                                                            
Under the United Nations, the Gambia and Zimbabwe have both submitted reports through the 
Universal Periodic Review process. The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a unique process 
which involves a review of the human rights records of all UN Member States. The UPR is a 
State-driven process, under the auspices of the Human Rights Council, which provides the 
opportunity for each State to declare what actions they have taken to improve the human rights  
in their countries and to fulfil their human rights obligations.467  As one of the main features of 
the Council, the UPR is designed to ensure equal treatment for every country when their human 
rights  are assessed.468 The ultimate aim of this mechanism is to improve the human rights 
situation in all countries and address human rights violations wherever they occur. Currently, 
no other universal mechanism of this kind exists.469 Through UPR process, states may review 
their democratic elections since all human rights are interdependent and interrelated as 
stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human rights.470 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the RECs are committed to ensuring credible and legitimate 
elections as evidenced by obligations contained in various treaties. The chapter examined the 
role of the Regional Organizations (RECs) in upholding credibility and legitimacy of electoral 
processes in Africa. The chapter demonstrated that RECs are critical stakeholders in ensuring 
credible and legitimate elections within AU Member States. They have helped Member States 
 











comply with their international legal commitments on democratic elections.471 The chapter also 
showed how RECs have dealt with election disputes through political dialogues, negotiations 
and mediation. RECs are protecting democratic elections through election monitoring and 
observation. In addition, elections are also protected by the RECs through regional courts and 
tribunals established by the RECs. Furthermore, the chapter demonstrated that human rights 
are interdependent and interconnected and that democratic elections are connected to many 
rights. No right can be enjoyed in isolation. Finally, this Chapter showed that, while RECs 
demonstrate commitment to ensure credible and legitimate elections in their regions, in 
practice, states often fail to comply with the REC’s obligations.472 States also often fail to report 
timeously to the treaty bodies. In some cases, states have failed to ratify treaty provisions to 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This study concludes that RECs are the linchpin and drivers for strong democratic institutions 
in Africa. As subsidiary bodies of the African Union they are complementing its work.  Their 
broad mandate includes, economic, social and political integration, promotion and protection 
of democracy and human rights, and peace and security within their regions. In addition, they 
are advancing the AU’s shared values, norms, and standards regarding continental unity, 
integration, peace and security. RECs are also involved in various transformative programs to 
enhance stability, development, and human rights. Apart from their broad mandate discussed, 
this study has demonstrated that RECs are committed to ensuring credible and legitimate 
elections as evidenced by obligations contained in various treaties. As shown in the study, 
RECs have helped Member States comply with their international legal commitments on 
democratic elections. They have dealt with election disputes through political dialogues, 
negotiations and mediation. They protect democratic elections through election monitoring and 
observation. Within the RECS elections have also been protected through regional courts and 
tribunals. This study, although acknowledging the importance of the RECs on democratic 
elections, also concludes that human rights are interdependent and interconnected. Therefore, 
democratic elections are connected to many rights. They cannot be enjoyed in isolation. 
Protection of the right to vote paves way to enjoyment of several human rights. 
5.1.2 Role and Importance of the RECs 
This study concludes that RECs are committed to ensuring credible and legitimate elections as 
evidenced by obligations contained in their various treaties and instruments. However, in 
practice, states have often failed to comply with the RECs and violated their international legal 
commitments. To ensure credibility and legitimacy of elections RECs should effectively play 
an important role in mediation, negotiation, and political dialogues within states in cases of 
election disputes. In addition, they should support Member States in pre- and post-electoral 
audits and electoral observations. More so, various structures and mechanisms such as the 
African Commission, Regional courts, Regional Review bodies such as the Africa Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM) and Universal Periodic Review (UPR) should be fully utilised to enhance 




Apart from peaceful ways of protecting and promoting the credibility and legitimacy of 
elections, the ECOWAS military intervention in the Gambia election crisis offers lessons for 
other RECs in Africa and how they can promote and protect democratic elections. Other lessons 
include upholding presidential term limits and the respect of will of the people. The use of 
force in certain circumstances such as in the case of Gambia may be useful to protect human 
rights and the will of the people. However, the study concludes that RECs have not been free 
from challenges. The following are the conclusions that flow from the analysis of the study: 
5.2 Conclusions 
This study concludes that there is adequate legal framework governing democratic elections in 
Africa. The structures and mechanisms put in place by the RECs are adequate for 
democratization to be fully realised. Democratic elections are fundamental elements of human 
rights facilitating the realisation of other rights. Credible and legitimate elections must be 
conducted in accordance with the law and must reflect the will of the people. Marginalised 
groups such as women and youth should fully participate in the selection of their government. 
Regional organisations play an important role in protecting democratic elections and 
safeguarding the will of the electorates.  
5.2.1 Legitimacy and Credibility of Elections 
This study concludes that credible and legitimate electoral processes must meet international 
and regional standards as stipulated by the law. They must be respected by all key players in 
an election especially opposition parties, the independent electoral commissions, election 
observers and all stakeholders involved in an election. Most importantly, credible and 
legitimate elections are those which satisfy the loser. A loser must agree or have some 
consensus with the winner. As demonstrated in this study, most African governments have 
failed to provide an atmosphere in which losers concede losing elections peacefully. 
Furthermore, as earlier argued, human rights are interdependent, therefore when the right to 
vote is affected all other rights are affected. This study concludes that democratic elections are 
important to the realisation of several human rights. Without them several human rights cannot 
be fully enjoyed.  
5.3 Recommendations  
In view of the shortcomings identified in this study, the study would like to put forward the 




5.3.1 Strengthening the Role of RECs in Mediation and Political Dialogue 
RECs have dealt with election disputes through political dialogues, negotiations and 
mediations. This study recommends strengthening their role through building the conflict 
resolution capacity of REC leaders, politicians, and other key actors in governance 
structures.474 Strengthening capacity for REC leaders is important for the quality of work they 
will produce. For example, this would result in enhanced and quality mediation, negotiation 
skills for these leaders. When capacity building for REC leaders is successful, the institutions, 
structures and mechanisms for the RECs would serve their true purpose. 
5.3.2 Strengthening the Election Observation Missions  
Disputes over the legitimacy of election results in Africa could be reduced if the election 
observation missions (EOM) are transparent in their reporting. Premature endorsement of 
election results should be avoided, as was the case with the SADC region. This study 
recommends that elections observation should be strengthened by means of good, quality and 
regular training for election observers. Election Observers should also be selected from people 
of high moral character, and skilled professionals who would do their work without bias or 
being partisan. 
5.3.3 The Role of RECs in Military Intervention and the Use of Sanctions 
This study recommends the use of force as last resort by the RECs (in coordination with the 
AU PSC and the UN) in the event of violation of democratic elections when the mediation and 
negotiation efforts had failed. The case of the Gambia is a sound example. It is, therefore, 
recommended that apart from the use of force, the use of sanctions by the RECs in the event of 
violation of democratic elections are appropriate. The case of the ECOWAS region is a fitting 
example in this study. 
5.3.4 State Reporting 
This study recommends that States must report timely to treaty bodies.  This may enhance and 
improve human rights within States. Through reporting to treaty bodies, States can do self-
introspection on their progress. For instance, the APRM and UPR as reporting mechanisms for 
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States should be fully utilised by states for their good and improvement of human rights. RECs 
must play a key role to ensure that States fully participate in these mechanisms established. 
5.3.5 Strengthening Opposition Parties 
Opposition parties should be strengthened and allowed to freely participate and express 
themselves in a credible and legitimate election. Without their meaningful participation, the 
legitimacy and credibility of elections would remain contested. Strengthening could be done 
by means of building capacity of opposition leaders through REC electoral programs. Such 
leaders should receive support from the RECs during elections to ensure their rights are 
respected by the state and that they have free and fair ground for contesting the elections. 
5.3.6 Improving transformative Programmes by the RECs 
RECs have been central to various transformative programmes on the continent,475 these 
programs, such as APRM and UPR, should be enhanced to improve governance structures 
within African states.  Ordinary citizens should know about these programmes and how their 
states participate in them. These transformative programmes, if taken seriously by States, 
should improve governance structures on the continent.  
5.3.7 Functional Regional Courts  
It is recommended that regional courts and tribunals must be respected by states. The case of 
the SADC court is a good example in which the court has been undermined and impunity was 
allowed to prevail. Politics should not be allowed to raise over human rights. Courts should 
have adequate jurisdiction to protect citizen’s human rights within the region.  This study 
recommends that if States are unwilling to protect fundamental human rights of their citizens 
and to comply with regional courts, sanctions and in some cases the use of force is necessary 
from the RECs. 
Finally, it can be said that regional organizations play an important role in democratization and 
protection of democratic elections. Although there are challenges in the protection of 
democratic elections among the RECs, their role may not be underestimated. RECs presence, 
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